Today Trends

Author: Zeying Wu, Boston University Some scholars have argued that China’s economic opening-up was a result of Chinese leaders’ acceptance of neoliberalism. But unlike neoliberal economists who consider economic openness as a goal itself, Chinese leaders treated economic openness as a strategic means to achieve domestic goals. It was when the domestic market experienced sluggish demand in the mid-1990s that then-president Jiang Zemin launched the ‘ going out strategy ’. The strategy encouraged competitive Chinese industries and enterprises to capture a greater share of the global market and to gain access to global capital, technology and know-how. Before globalisation became a popular narrative in China, at the Third Plenary Session of the 14th Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1993, Jiang had already mentioned the strategic principle of fully utilising the ‘ two resources and two markets .’ This principle stressed Chinese enterprises’ penetration into f

Author: Hendrik A. Pasligh, Young Leader, Pacific Forum In August 2021, Second Vice Foreign Minister Choi Jong-moon announced that South Korea intends to broaden the objectives of its young but thriving space program. The main drivers behind the program were economic development and the country’s unique national security situation , which requires satellites to monitor missile launches in the northern part of the peninsula. Seoul is now giving diplomacy and global space governance new importance. This announcement comes as the United States lifted missile restrictions on South Korea. Seoul also joined the Artemis Accords in the wake of a meeting between South Korean President Moon Jae-in and US President Joe Biden in early 2021. In August, the two countries’ militaries also signed a memorandum of understanding with the aim to institutionalise consultation on space policy. South Korea’s ambitions bear great potential but also face challenges. The history of South Korea’s space pr

Author: Chandrakant Lahariya, New Delhi With the global spread of the COVID-19 Delta variant, it is clear that the fate of the world, even in countries with high vaccination coverage, is interlinked with every person on the planet. But global health leaders and communities seem to be learning slowly. The race to administer vaccines with a continued prioritisation of domestic needs — while many more in low-income countries are left waiting for their first shots — is telling. The COVAX initiative led by the World Health Organization (WHO) and others to make vaccines available for low- and middle-income countries depends largely upon vaccine manufacturers in India. The very first shot channelled through COVAX was manufactured in India, and the country initially exported more doses than it administered at home. But the onset of India’s ferocious second wave led it to implement a ‘temporary’ ban on exports of COVID-19 vaccines that continues to this day. This measure had its origin in

Author: Editorial Board, ANU Engagement has been the bedrock of Canada’s approach towards China for over 50 years. In 1970, Pierre Trudeau, father of Justin, the current Canadian Prime Minister, was among the first Western leaders to open diplomatic relations with Beijing, before the visit of US President Nixon shifted the logjam on US–China relations in 1971. Canada’s co-location alongside its nuclear superpower protector in no way inhibited strategic initiative on China; indeed, it created the space for it. Caught on the battle front in the crossfire between a more assertive and formidable China and a United States that has suddenly swung into action in the so-called ‘new Cold War’, Canada’s engagement strategy is now under pressure. Canada’s predicament is encapsulated in the angst generated around the drawn-out detention of Michael Kovrig and Michael Spavor in China (the two Michaels) and the arrest of Huawei CFO Meng Wanzhou in Vancouver on an extradition order requested by th

Author: Paul Evans, UBC This is a febrile moment in Canada–China relations. Diplomatic interactions are on ice, trade in goods is hot, public feelings are sour, the ‘3Ms’ dispute over detained citizens remains unresolved, and a federal election campaign has just been launched. Recent parliamentary activism in Canada includes a rancorous set of committee hearings, a House of Commons resolution labelling Chinese actions in Xinjiang a ‘genocide’, a Senate vote narrowly defeating a similar resolution, and many MPs joining networks and activities opposed to Chinese actions in Xinjiang and Hong Kong. The public mood is agitated and negative. The media and information landscape is somewhere between critical and hostile. The online world is toxic and dangerous terrain for those trying to explain — much less defend — Chinese actions. A whiff of McCarthyism floats in the air as some insist on loyalty tests based on views of Chinese communism. ‘Elite capture’ is offered as an explanation of

Author: Sourabh Gupta, ICAS The Australia–China relationship has been in the deep doldrums for some time now. Australian commentary pins the blame for the deterioration of bilateral ties on ‘China’s aggressive attempt to expand the domestic authoritarianism of [Chinese] President Xi Jinping into the Indo-Pacific region’. In the dominant narrative the contention that the Australian national security establishment’s sledging transformed China into the enemy gets short shrift. But Australia’s 2020 Defence Strategic Update is more-or-less premised on this reading of China . President Xi has been a polarising political conservative and an underwhelming economic reformer. He has exploited China’s deep pockets to acquire influence and technologies by all available means . His intonations on neighbourhood diplomacy ring hollow, having failed to stitch up even a middling fishing rights agreement after eight years of unrivalled power. And at the first hint of regional tension, his militar

Authors: Arman Kishan, Kathmandu Medical College, Binod Rayamajhee, UNSW and KRIBS and Supram Hosuru Subramanya, Manipal Academy of Higher Education A second wave of COVID-19 has been devastating Nepal, resulting in more than 6000 deaths in three months. Frontline healthcare workers are unable to cope with the exponential surge of COVID-19 patients. Nepal recorded 57 times more COVID-19 cases each day in June compared to the month before , with 44 per cent of tests returning positive results. Mass and social gatherings — including religious festivals, political meetings and weddings — continued in Nepal despite the government’s order to stay at home. Nepal’s former king and queen tested positive for COVID-19 after a visit to India to take a holy dip at the Har Ki Pauri ghat in Haridwar. Hundreds of people gathered at the Kathmandu airport to welcome the former king and queen upon their return, ignoring health restrictions. Due to political uncertainty , the Nepal government is n

Author: Qaisar Khan, Lahore University of Management Sciences Pakistan is the sixth most populous country in the world, with an estimated 208 million people. Its population growth rate is also the highest in the region at 2.4 per cent annually. At this pace, the population will reach 337 million by 2050. This poses a serious challenge to the country’s health, education and labour market systems. Pakistan must prepare now for the future. Pakistan’s current birth rate is 3.6 births per woman, one of the highest in the region. It also has the lowest contraceptive prevalence rate (35 per cent) in South Asia. Much of the population using contraceptives do so out of their preference for a son. Pakistan has one of the highest desired sex ratios at birth and couples tend to produce children until they have achieved the desired number of sons. This high fertility poses serious challenges to the health of mothers and newborns — 38 per cent of children under five years of age are stunted, 18

Author: Vinod Thomas, AIM Taxing the carbon content of imports, if done right, can contribute to cutting global emissions and slowing climate change. The European Union has made the first such proposal, and its potential for good or for harm can be seen in relation to how it might work in Asia — the bloc’s major trading partner and a region with very high stakes on global warming. The proposal will enhance the wellbeing of people and the health of the planet if its implementation contributes to lowering the high carbon intensity of international trade in Asia. But it will turn into an economically costly project if it degenerates into a protectionist trade war between regions. The starting point for worrying about international trade in the context of climate change is that calculations of country responsibility for global emissions usually leave out the roughly one-fifth of effluents that are embedded in traded goods. Accounting for these would be timely as the divergence betwe

Author: Ken Kotani, RUSI When asked about Japan participating in the Five Eyes intelligence-sharing alliance, ex-US and British intelligence officers usually claimed it was difficult because Japan differs in culture and language. This situation has dramatically changed in recent years. Last year, UK Prime Minister Boris Johnson made positive remarks about Japan joining the alliance . Former US deputy secretary of state Richard Armitage also wrote that ‘the United States and Japan should make serious efforts to move toward a Six Eyes network’. Japanese security scholars Richard Samuels and Brad Williams similarly mentioned the possibility of Japan’s participation in the alliance in their recent studies. Meanwhile, Japan’s ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) published a December 2020 report , ‘Towards Establishing an Economic Security Strategy’, outlining that Japan ‘should seek to join the Five Eyes alliance’. In view of the recent Chinese maritime expansionism in Southeast Asia,

Author: Michael Clarke, UTS and ANU The withdrawal of the United States from Afghanistan has prompted much breathless commentary, including on the implications for China’s role in the region. But despite predictions of sweeping geopolitical gains, China will be observing the Taliban takeover with significant concern. One narrative suggests that US withdrawal from Afghanistan will enable China to swoop in and scoop up the country’s mineral resources or broker a partnership with the Taliban to make Afghanistan a vital part of its Belt and Road Initiative. Supposedly, it may even prompt Beijing to ‘prosecute its interests with regard to Taiwan’ in the near term. Such commentary is hyperbolic. It ignores both the record of China’s relationship with the Taliban when they controlled most of Afghanistan in the 1990s and the hierarchy of Beijing’s interests in Central Asia. China’s defensive interests — such as ensuring no spill-over of security threats from Afghanistan into Xinjiang —