Today Trends

Author: Editorial Board, ANU Thailand has paid a big price for the inability of its conservative elites to come to terms with the populist challenge to their dominance that emerged during the prime ministership of Thaksin Shinawatra from 2001 to 2006. Two military coups, three constitutions and four general elections down the line, Thaksinist populism is still a formidable political force. Efforts by the leaders of the 2006 military coup that ousted Thaksin failed to prevent a comeback for the Pheu Thai party — successor to his banned Thai Rak Thai — in the 2011 elections. His sister Yingluck was likewise ejected in a military coup in 2014 after her government’s wasteful rice-buying scheme became a national scandal . After that 2014 coup, anti-Thaksin forces held off the threat of Pheu Thai, and a resurgent liberal anti-junta movement embodied in the Future Forward Party, with a combination of an electoral system stacked in the junta’s favour and persistent ‘lawfare’ against oppon

Author: Greg Raymond, ANU The ghost of elections past hangs uneasily over the upcoming electoral contest in Thailand, waged on a battleground of big-spending promises. If the military-proxy parties are nudged from power, will this finally settle the country back on a course of stable electoral democracy that was undermined by the 2006 and 2014 military coups? Or will it open another iteration of the wongchon ubat , the evil cycle in which Thailand oscillates between popularly elected governments and military dictatorships? In 2019, many voters previously loyal to Pheu Thai, the party of the polarising Shinawatra clan, repressed their inner feelings — and, wanting an end to the ‘colour wars’ between their so-called ‘red shirt’ supporters and ‘yellow shirt’ conservatives, voted with their heads. They were attracted by what they saw as stability in the form of the military proxy party Palang Pracharat and its prime ministerial candidate, coup leader Prayuth Chan-o-cha as well as the

Author: Subas P Dhakal, University of New England Governments worldwide have used Social Protection Programmes (SPPs) to strategically assist marginalised and vulnerable citizens to cope with hardships and social exclusion. SPPs typically include a mix of contributory schemes , including insurance  pensions and non-contributory schemes, such as cash transfers and subsidies. Advancing SPPs is integral to the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda — Sustainable Development Goal 10 specifically calls for leveraging SPPs to reduce inequality. Less than half of the global population has access to SPPs . The situation in developing economies like Nepal is much worse, where, on aggregate, only one-third of citizens access SPPs. Nepal provides an interesting case because SPPs have been considered instrumental in its recovery from three significant crises in the new millennium — a decade-long civil war that ended in 2006, the 2015 Earthquake and the COVID-19 pandemic . The Integrated Social

Author: Xirui Li, NTU The private sector and foreign investors have become increasingly sceptical about doing business in China since COVID-19. The risks of shutdowns, travel restrictions, disruptions to normal operation and supply chains, and liquidity shortages resulting from China’s zero-COVID policy have significantly shaken their confidence. China has engaged in a multi-pronged regulatory crackdown on a wide range of sectors, from platform economy to online finance to real estate. The crackdown signals that Beijing values loyalty from the private sector and financial stability over growth and access to capital. Beijing’s advocation for ‘common prosperity’ and opposition to ‘unconstrained economic growth’ has only heightened business concerns regarding China’s aggressive redistribution policies. The increasing antagonism and decoupling between China and the West as well as China’s decision to develop ‘ self-reliance in technology and science ’ have created enormous uncert

Author: Gilang Kembara, CSIS Indonesia China’s easing of COVID-19 countermeasures in December 2022 spurred the resumption of several economic and social activities that were impossible six months prior. International travel and tourism have gradually restarted while international meetings and conferences can once again be held in China. China’s reopening provides hope for the resumption of state-to-state political cooperation too, especially on the South China Sea. High on the agenda is the negotiation of the South China Sea Code of Conduct (CoC), which was delayed for more than two years due to the pandemic. Although parties hope for the CoC’s earliest conclusion, officials are still unable to give a clear timeline on when that might occur. The conclusion and ratification of the CoC would be a major milestone for ASEAN–China relations and the South China Sea dispute . It would showcase the ability of both parties to accept differences and agree on a potentially legally binding

Authors: Mohammad Sultan Ahmad Ansari, Modern College of Business and Science and Shad Ahmad Khan, University of Buraimi Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) has been a crucial driver of economic growth in developing countries. Bhutan, a small and landlocked country with limited natural resources, has recognised the importance of FDI in boosting its economic growth. But the Bhutanese government has adopted a cautious approach towards FDI, as it believes that FDI should align with its unique development philosophy of Gross National Happiness . Bhutan has mainly attracted FDI in the hydropower sector , which is one of its major sources of revenue. The government has also tried to diversify the economy by promoting sectors such as tourism, agriculture and manufacturing. But inadequate infrastructure, limited skilled labour and bureaucratic hurdles have hindered the inflow of FDI into these sectors. To foster economic efficiency and competition, Bhutan has been gradually privatising its st

Author: Evelyn Goh, ANU In her travels over the past 10 months, Australian Foreign Minister Penny Wong has referred repeatedly to Australia’s search for ‘a strategic equilibrium’. In Kuala Lumpur and Singapore in mid-2022, Wong described Canberra’s desire for a regional order as ‘framed by a strategic equilibrium where countries are not forced to choose but can make their own sovereign choices’ when explaining Australia’s Quad and AUKUS partnerships . Wong’s National Press Club speech on 17 April 2023 more explicitly connected this search for equilibrium to the waning of US hegemony. The United States remains the indispensable power in the Asia Pacific region — but ‘the nature of that indispensability has changed’. The Asia Pacific is now a multipolar region and ‘we cannot just leave it to the US’, Wong warned. All countries of the region must use diplomatic, economic and other means ‘to maintain the region’s balance’. Southeast Asian observers might be forgiven for thinking that

Author: Jose Sousa-Santos, ANU and Anna Powles, Massey University The diplomatic spat surrounding China’s Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Ma Zhaoxu’s visit to Suva in April 2023 captured shifting geostrategic developments in Fiji. Ma’s meeting with Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabuka was cancelled due to a bereavement in Rabuka’s family. Deputy Prime Minister Manoa Kamikamica was instead put forward to meet with Ma. Chinese officials initially rejected the proposition, insisting that Ma would only meet with the Fijian Prime Minister. Ma’s visit was ostensibly to deliver a message directly to Rabuka about the importance of ‘treading carefully on Taiwan’ and respecting Beijing’s ‘red line’. The episode reflected growing tensions between China and Fiji. Under its new coalition government, Fiji is showing signs of greater alignment on security matters with its traditional partners — Australia, New Zealand and the United States. Rabuka is appearing to tilt Fiji away from his predec

Author: Chris Bullen, University of Auckland In 2011 the New Zealand government adopted the goal of making New Zealand smoke-free by 2025. Almost half a million New Zealanders smoke daily, and tobacco smoking kills approximately 4500 New Zealanders every year. Currently, smoking is at an all-time low at around 9 per cent of the population. But this number is much higher for Māori and Pacific peoples, as well as socioeconomically disadvantaged people. New Zealand has long been a leader in ‘best practice’ tobacco control, adopting a mix of policies to discourage people from smoking by legislating for smoke-free indoor workplaces, schools, cafes, bars and cars. Laws prohibit the advertising of tobacco products and require standardised packaging with graphic warnings on cigarette packets. Support for smokers to quit smoking is very accessible. Annual increases in taxation have led to the price of tobacco being among the highest in the world. But continuation of this current tobacco co

Author: Dennis LC Weng, Sam Houston State University The Taiwan Ministry of National Defense’s revised draft of the All-out Defense Mobilization Readiness Act has sparked widespread concern among citizens and free speech advocates. While the proposed revisions were withdrawn within one week , the controversy reflected a profound concern in Taiwan. The revisions would require all news and media organisations to ‘cooperate with government controls that may be enforced on all information networks’, and impose stricter penalties on actions deemed detrimental to national security, such as disseminating false information and disregarding government directives. Efforts to stop China’s disinformation campaigns are commendable, but the proposed amendments raise serious concerns about the future of media freedom and political dissent in Taiwan. The ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) government plans to expand the operative period of the Act from wartime to the so-called ‘war preparat