Today Trends

Author: Biswajit Dhar, Council for Social Development The unpredictable nature of India’s agricultural sector highlights how quickly a country producing exportable surpluses can turn into one grappling with potential supply shortages in the domestic market. These supply shortages raise the prospect of food insecurity and food price inflation. In response, the government immediately clamped down on exports, beginning with staples like wheat and rice. In April 2023, India celebrated a record-breaking agricultural export performance, which had surpassed US$42 billion in the preceding year. This level of exports exceeded the pre-pandemic record achieved in 2018–2019 by almost 48 per cent. Rice exports had increased by over 15 per cent and pulses by over 84 per cent, while sugar exports were more than 25 per cent above the previous year’s level. Such positive signs were seen as a major step towards the implementation of the 2018 National Agriculture Export Policy. The bullish expectati

Author: Richard Katz, Carnegie Council for Ethics in International Affairs Had Deng Xiaoping not sought and received advice from Japan and Singapore in his creation of ‘socialism with Japanese and Singaporean characteristics’, China’s economic miracle would have been less miraculous. China’s current economic woes stem largely from Xi Jinping’s abandonment of this paradigm. When Mao Zedong died in 1976, China was the second poorest among 140 countries . Deng Xiaoping proclaimed a remedy of ‘reform and opening up’ to foreign countries, drawing from previous Asian success stories. During an October 1978 trip to Japan, Deng met with business leaders, toured a Nissan auto plant and saw China’s future. ‘We are a backward country, and we need to learn from Japan’, he told a press conference in Tokyo. His first official foreign economic advisor was Saburo Okita, one of the legendary architects of Japan’s economic miracle. Over the years, 22,000 advisors from Singapore came to China. Instea

Author: Atsushi Yamagata, University of Wollongong On 9 June 2023, the Japanese Diet passed a bill to amend the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA). As a result of this amendment, on 1 December 2023, Japan, which has been urged to accept more refugees, will introduce a new category of status for asylum seekers, called hokanteki hogo taishosha (persons to be granted complementary protection). This status is given to individuals who fear persecution for reasons other than the five stipulated in Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention — race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion — but who meet other criteria of the Convention’s definition of refugee. Schemes to protect people who do not fall within the definition of refugee have been formalised in other developed countries in the past few decades. The European Union stipulates that those outside the refugee definition may still qualify as a ’person eligible for

Author: Marina Yue Zhang, UTS Japanese automaker Mitsubishi Motors announced in October 2023 it was pulling out of a joint venture with the Guangzhou Automobile Group (GAC) amid declining sales and fierce competition from electric and hybrid vehicles. The decision highlights the broader challenges that foreign automakers face in China and the significant shifts in the global automotive sector. GAC is one of China’s leading automotive manufacturers that serves as a local partner for several Japanese automakers, including Toyota, Honda and Subaru. These joint ventures have enhanced GAC’s production capabilities while opening up China’s vast car market to foreign manufacturers. This collaboration aligns with the government’s ‘ technology for market ‘ strategy, introduced in the 1990s to bolster its domestic automobile industry. Auto production surge d as a result, climbing from a mere 500,000 units in 1998 to over 10 million by 2009, and will likely reach 30 million by the end of 20

Author: Ken Heydon, LSE After five years of intense negotiation, the proposed preferential trade agreement (PTA) between Australia and the European Union is in trouble. On 29 October 2023, talks were suspended, with little immediate prospect of resumption. This setback, plus other recent developments in EU preferential trade policy, offer some broad lessons — for both Australia and the region. The failed negotiation is, in part, a victim of current times. With liberal trade policy in retreat , government-fuelled industrial policy is on the rise, and, according to the Eurobarometer Poll of July 2022 , the majority of Europeans now view protectionism positively. The immediate cause of breakdown in the talks was, unsurprisingly, agriculture. This is the sector that, given EU intransigence, was a key factor in the failure of the Doha Development Round of multilateral trade talks. Agriculture is still the beneficiary of massive industry assistance within the European Union. Though the

Author: Yasuo Takao, Curtin University In 2020, the Japanese government announced its commitment to achieving net zero greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. But Japan has significantly lagged behind other major economies, such as the European Union, United Kingdom and New Zealand, in implementing carbon pricing. Japan is now seeking to align itself with the strategies embraced by these countries. In April 2023, the Japanese government initiated a carbon pricing initiative with the aim of incentivising businesses to substantially reduce their carbon emissions. While Japan’s carbon credit system is evolving, it faces emerging challenges. Incremental improvements in technology and market efficiency that the Japanese government has pursued are insufficient to achieve the ambitious net zero emissions target . Initiated in 2008, J-Credit provides a framework for government-certified exchanges of credits related to reductions and absorption of greenhouse gas emissions. On 11 October 2023, th

Author: Masahiro Mogaki, Keio University Japan’s Prime Minister, Fumio Kishida, reshuffled his cabinet and key positions within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) in September 2023, with limited impact on his overall support rate. Examination by commentators has revealed Kishida’s approach to the new appointments. Among the major LDP factions — the Seiwakai faction, the Heisei Kenkyukai faction and the Shikokai faction were given favourable treatment. Heisei Kenkyukai faction leader Toshimitsu Motegi was reappointed as LDP Secretary-General and Shikokai faction leader, Taro Aso, was as LDP Vice President. The new appointments within the LDP secretariat reflect Kishida’s desire to exert firm control over his party. Former deputy chief cabinet secretary Seiji Kihara was appointed as a Special Assistant to the LDP Policy Research Council Chairman. Those close to former prime minister Yoshihide Suga secured only a few significant positions. Even the reappointment of Taro Kono

Author: Editorial Board, ANU The past decade has seen a remarkable resurgence in the popularity of industrial policy in the developed world. There are a number of reasons behind the turn to state intervention in developed economies. Most notable among them, the fragmenting geopolitical environment has led governments to be suspicious of openness to international trade. The political failure in countries like the United States and Australia of first-best, price-based policies to address carbon emissions has also encouraged the adoption of second-best industrial policies to boost the supply of, and demand for, technologies that will be crucial to reducing carbon emissions and achieving net zero goals. In addition, a pronounced and widening inequality in developed countries has been blamed on de-industrialisation, and the solution offered has been new incentives to revive the manufacturing sector and create jobs. In middle income countries, there is burgeoning confidence about their

Author: Mary E Lovely, Peterson Institute for International Economics Even as they share similar concerns about economic security and resilience, the United States’ trading partners in Asia wonder what Washington’s new embrace of industrial policy means for their own development. With deep government pockets, a large domestic market and potent research and development capabilities, the United States has the economic power to capture a significant share of global investment in targeted industrial sectors. The US turn towards protectionism and its desire to shift trade to ‘like-minded’ friends raise fears that the US market will be closed to Asian exports unless US demands for common standards and supply chain configurations are met. The CHIPS and Science Act , passed by the US Congress in 2022, illustrates Washington’s ‘reshoring’ intentions and their implications for trading partners. The act is designed to ‘bring back’ domestic semiconductor manufacturing that is presently concen

Authors: Wanning Sun, UTS, and Haiqing Yu, RMIT Recent narratives surrounding People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s influence have framed Australia’s Chinese-language media as problematic. Central is anxiety about the Chinese government’s possible use of diasporic Chinese communities and its media to push its influence. Some claim Chinese-language media outlets in Australia are primarily instruments of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). WeChat, owned by China’s Tencent, is often blamed for disseminating propaganda to Chinese diasporic communities. Anxiety about China is neither new nor unique . But little has been done to understand Chinese-language media in Australia. Considering this, a five-year study was undertaken. This five-year study shows that the Chinese social media platform WeChat — and its Chinese version Weixin — is one of the main news channels used by Chinese Australians.  This is highlighted by data from two surveys conducted on Chinese Australians in 2018–19. O