Today Trends

Author: Niharika Rustagi, NUS It has been 25 years since the Women’s Reservation Bill — a constitutional amendment proposing that 33 per cent of seats in India’s central and state assemblies be reserved for women — was first introduced to the Indian Parliament in 1996. The representation of women in different legislative bodies remains low across India. India ranks 148 out of 193 countries in the number of elected female representatives in parliament, with Afghanistan ranking 71st, Bangladesh 111th, Bhutan 145th, Nepal 47th and Pakistan 116th. While the global average for female representation in lower chambers or unicamerals is 25.8 per cent, India stands at 14.4 per cent . The 78 (out of 543 members) women elected to the lower chamber elected in 2019 is India’s highest proportion to date. Women make up 11.2 per cent, or 27 out of 241 members, of the upper chamber. But despite those dismal figures, the debate over the Bill has not featured prominently in national political disco

Author: Alexander Korolev, UNSW As the war in Ukraine drags on, the international community’s accusatory glare has extended beyond Russia to other states that allegedly support the war. China’s diplomatic dance to reconcile ‘respect for Ukraine’s sovereignty’ and ‘Russia’s legitimate security interests’ in Ukraine stands out in this regard. Given the gravity of the situation, the pressure on China from the United States and its allies to assign blame for the war is growing. By not distancing itself from Moscow, Beijing bears serious reputational costs and potentially risks becoming a target of secondary economic sanctions in the future. Whether Beijing was informed by Russia in advance or not, it did not want to see this war in its current form. Yet China is unlikely to explicitly condemn Russia, press Russia to stop the war or undermine its strategic alignment with Russia. US President Joe Biden’s unsuccessful negotiations with Chinese President Xi Jinping underscored this realit

Author: Masakazu Toyoda, Institute of Energy Economics Few people would have thought that the Ukraine crisis would come a few months after the COP26 climate conference. People around the world are now reflecting on the added complexity of achieving decarbonisation at the same time as ensuring energy security. In mid-October 2021, Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s cabinet approved Japan’s Sixth Basic Energy Plan. The plan represents a concrete roadmap for realising two commitments made by former prime minister Yoshihide Suga: to decarbonise by 2050 and to achieve a 46 per cent greenhouse gas reduction (the base year is 2013) by 2030. The Ukraine crisis has inflated oil, gas and coal prices — which were already on the rise due to the recovery from COVID-19 — and has prompted calls for a reduction in dependence on Russia. Europe, which is highly dependent on Russia, has been seriously affected. But the impact of the crisis on Japan is expected to be less serious because of its mor

Authors: Shiro Armstrong, ANU and Yose Rizal Damuri, CSIS East Asia’s Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) came into force in 2022 as the world’s largest free trade agreement. It was ratified in the face of major international trade and political uncertainties and is a significant boost to the global trading system. That’s just the start. Its greatest potential lies in its economic cooperation agenda that could transform RCEP beyond a negotiated agreement into a dynamic regional partnership. RCEP brings Australia, China, Japan, South Korea and New Zealand into an agreement centred on the 10-member ASEAN and accounts for about 31 per cent of global GDP and population and 27 per cent global merchandise trade. The agreement keeps markets open and updates trade and investment rules in East Asia, a major centre of global economic activity, at a time of rising protectionism and a threatened WTO. One of the pillars of RCEP is an economic cooperation agenda which has its an

Author: Alicia Garcia-Herrero, Bruegal Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the unprecedented sanctions imposed against Russia by the United States, Europe and other countries are negatively impacting the global economy. The European economy is under particular strain due to its dependence on Russian energy and the huge flow of refugees it is absorbing. The direct impact on the Chinese economy is expected to be relatively muted though still negative, at least in the short run. The jump in global energy prices stemming from the war is bad news for China given its dependence on energy imports. To meet its carbon reduction goals set within the current Five Year Plan, China planned to transition away from coal through additional natural gas imports. One of the outcomes of the Chinese leaders’ ‘Two Sessions’ in early March 2022 was to pause annual carbon emission targets — while keeping the overall 2025 targets — to gain some flexibility amid soaring energy prices. Beyond the temporary dela

Author: Editorial Board, ANU Australians head to the polls on 21 May to choose between the incumbent conservative Liberal-National coalition or the opposition Labor Party. The management of the economy will dominate their choices, as will the American presidential-style popularity contest between Prime Minister Scott Morrison and opposition leader Anthony Albanese. In the lead up to calling the election, national security and China have been used by the government to try to wedge the Labor opposition and have become contentious issues, alongside economic, financial and health recovery from the COVID-19 pandemic. Foreign policy rarely plays a prominent role in Australian elections and the Labor opposition has tried to keep it that way. The Australia–China relationship has hit what many thought was rock bottom a number of times but continues to worsen. Chinese assertiveness and trade coercion has solidified Australia’s resolve and partners in the region have rhetorically supported Au

Author: Tom Westland, ANU Australia’s first national election since the start of the COVID pandemic is now underway. Before the Omicron wave of COVID extinguished the country’s pandemic good luck, the incumbent Liberal-National Party Coalition government was clearly hoping for a COVID election in which it could cash out Australia’s comparatively good performance in votes. As the new variant tore through an overconfident and underprepared country, the likelihood of a resounding re-election of the Morrison conservative coalition government began to look less certain, though it still remains a strong possibility. The shambolic handling of Omicron — born of an obsession with day-to-day crises and a lack of hard thinking about looming and long-term challenges — has parallels elsewhere in Australian policymaking. The country belatedly committed to net zero carbon emissions by 2050 but has no credible policy mechanism to deliver on its promise. The pandemic put the hammer to Australia’s e

Author: Charlie Barnes, ANU On Sunday 10 April, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison announced that the 2022 Australian federal election would be held on 21 May. In reality, the election campaign had been in full swing for weeks. Morrison’s prime ministership has been characterised more by scandals than programmatic reform and Labor has a six-point lead in published polls. His back is against the wall. But Morrison has proven himself to be an effective campaigner, coming from behind to win a ‘miracle’ election victory for his party in 2019. He will use all the tools at his disposal to win again in 2022, including foreign policy. Foreign policy has historically been relatively bipartisan in Australian politics and not a major issue in elections. But foreign policy can matter at the margins which is, after all, where elections are won or lost. The Coalition Government will not recoil from attempting to wedge the Labor Party on foreign policy if it can gain an advantage. There is

Author: Sam Roggeveen, Lowy Institute How should the relationship between domestic electoral politics and foreign policy in today’s Australia be characterised? The defining characteristic of the West’s democratic malaise is the disconnection between the public and the political class. This has been well documented by Peter Mair in the Uniting Kingdom and Europe ( Ruling the Void ), Theda Skocpol in the United States ( Diminished Democracy ) and in Australia by Andrew Leigh and Nick Terrell ( Reconnected ). The themes of these books are common: the public has drifted away from civic engagement with politics, as evidenced by sharply declining membership rates in political parties, unions, professional associations and churches. Australia’s major political parties have had to evolve to survive. They have become small (less than 1 per cent of Australians belong to a party), highly professionalised operations. Rather than acting as the voice of a mass of voters and facilitating the rise

Author: Denghua Zhang, ANU US–China geostrategic competition is intensifying in the Pacific as both governments commit more resources to battle for influence. The US government released its Indo-Pacific Strategy in February 2022, which fleshes out its policy priorities in the region. This document is based on the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ concept announced by previous president Donald Trump in 2017. The strategy testifies to US concerns about China, asserting that ‘intensifying American focus is due in part to the fact that the Indo-Pacific faces mounting challenges, particularly from [the People’s Republic of China]’. It lists China, COVID-19 and climate change as core challenges for the United States. Competition with China has received bipartisan support among the US Congress. The Department of Defense is at the forefront of US engagement with the Pacific. In August 2020 Mark Esper became the first US Secretary of Defense to visit Palau. He and the Palauan president rea