Today Trends

Author: Editorial Board, ANU The internet once promised a world of seamless connectivity for anyone with access to a digital device. As connectivity costs fell, the workplace became mobile, and digitalisation transformed industrial sectors, the laissez-faire agenda of digital developmentalists appeared to align with and promote democratic ideals. That was then. Today, even as cloud computing and digital transformation agendas have become mainstream, it is clear the threat of digital fragmentation must be actively addressed. The COVID-19 pandemic and associated lockdowns and social distancing accelerated an e-commerce boom and digitalisation globally. The uptake was most remarkable in Asia with 60 million new digital consumers in Southeast Asia. Over half of South Asians have experienced using the internet. Many can now work from home, access healthcare online, and touchless pay is widespread. Fax machines are finally starting to be phased out in high-tech Japan. Greater digitalis

Author: Anupam Chander, Georgetown University Are the Himalayas too high for the internet to pass? The prospect of an Asian digital single market seems remote, especially when India and China seem to be pulling apart. India is busy banning Chinese apps like TikTok, while China promulgates ever stricter rules on data transfer abroad. Asian governments still fail to see that rising above local conflicts might yield enormous dividends, strengthening their own economic security in the process. Digital single markets permit consumers and businesses to engage across national borders via the internet. They enable broad supply chains, build companies that can compete at a global level and reduce prices for consumers and businesses. Digital single markets help small businesses by reducing prices for key services from design, marketing, customer relations and accounting to hiring employees in foreign countries. But achieving a digital single market is not easy. It requires a degree of regulat

Author: David Simon, Yale University Earlier this year, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken announced the Biden administration’s recognition of Rohingya persecution in Myanmar — which dates back to at least 2016 — as a genocide. While the implications of the declaration are not yet immediately clear, history provides some guidance as to what they may be. The idea of a ’genocide declaration’ is itself a product of governments’ failure to recognise the unfolding of genocides Rwanda and Bosnia in the 1990s, in a manner consistent with the United Nations’ Genocide Convention’s definition of genocide. Both cases were highly ineffective, given US officials’ dithering responses to whether the term could be applied. Samantha Power’s award-winning critique of US policy toward genocide, A Problem from Hell , called for a greater willingness to recognise genocides as they unfold. To do so, she reasoned, was a prerequisite for a more robust response. The Bush administration’s 2004 declaratio

Author: Hipolitus Wangge, ANU Prime Minister James Marape visited Jakarta at the invitation of Indonesian President Joko Widodo in March 2022 — a few months ahead of PNG’s national elections. While the trip to boost his administration’s economic credentials by diversifying PNG’s trade with Southeast Asian countries, Indonesia saw the visit as an opportunity to expand its influence in PNG and the Pacific. The increasing presence of China and the dominance of Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific region are prompting the Pacific islands to search for strategic alternatives. Marape sees Indonesia — a source of trade and investment for PNG — as an attractive option. Indonesia–PNG trade reached US$322 million in 2021, up from US$212 million in 2020, with agricultural products and petroleum as the main exports of both countries. This increase is partly due to close economic relations between the two countries and the strong political commitment to strengthen their local economies ov

Authors: Julio S Amador III and Lisa Marie Palma, FACTS Asia Inc The recent high-level US–ASEAN Summit has shown that, despite challenges, there is room for productive engagement between Washington and Southeast Asia. In recognising the region’s strategic importance, the summit marked a divergence from former US president Donald Trump’s America First foreign policy. It also saw over $US150 million in investment promised towards climate action, sustainable development, education, health and maritime cooperation. The summit demonstrated that Washington’s ‘presence’ in the region — undergirded by the new Indo-Pacific Economic Framework ( IPEF ) — is critical to the Biden administration’s competition with Beijing. But ASEAN needs to clarify what it means when it says it wants a US ‘presence’ in the region. Since the 2010s, China has been consistent in its efforts to counter US influence in the region, with a focus on economic development facilitated through the Belt and Road Initiat

Author: Tharishini Krishnan, National Defence University Malaysia The ‘maritime security’ buzzphrase emerged in the late 1990s following the establishment of the ASEAN Centre for Combating Transnational Crime during the 1998 Hanoi Declaration. But the term focused broadly on piracy and armed robbery or transnational crime rather than on maritime security specifically. Since 2003, prioritisation of maritime security as a regional problem has enhanced member state responses and collaborative efforts. Maritime security was first raised as a key concern at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which called for more comprehensive guidelines for maritime security. Later, the Bali Concord II in 2003 addressed maritime security as a broader ASEAN problem, leading to the establishment of the ASEAN Maritime Forum (AMF) and Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum (EAMF) in 2012. Regional collaboration began to take shape with efforts such as the ‘Eyes in the Sky’, part of the Malacca Straits Security Initia

Author: Debashis Chakraborty, IIFT In a surprise move, India banned wheat exports on 13 May 2022, in order to ‘manage the overall food security of the country and to support other vulnerable countries’. Earlier it had appeared that India, the world’s second largest wheat producer, held sufficient stocks to meet demand from both domestic markets and from traditional buyers. India was also prepared to meet part of the global supply shortage resulting from Russia’s war against Ukraine. India is no greenhorn as far as export bans or restrictions on primary commodities are concerned. The country has intervened before for several agricultural products, including wheat and onions . But New Delhi’s most recent wheat decision received global attention due to the rise in per tonne wheat price from US$325 to US$450 after Russia’s decision to invade Ukraine. Increased shipments from India partially offset the supply shortage from Ukraine during April 2022. Since the Indian decision to ban

Author: Vasily Kashin, Higher School of Economics (Moscow) The conflict in Ukraine will have major strategic consequences for Chinese foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific. It will promote the deepening of Russian–Chinese economic cooperation that will make both countries more resilient to Western economic pressure. Long-term instability in Europe will make it more difficult for the United States to boost its Pacific presence for years to come with significant US financial and military resources being drawn toward supporting Ukraine. The conflict has demonstrated that the West is not able to impose sanctions on a major economy without damaging its own stability. The war has also shown the effectiveness of the Russian nuclear deterrent, making even a limited Western intervention unthinkable. China will be the main beneficiary of the Ukraine crisis. But this is not reflected in China’s political rhetoric which has been carefully calculated to avoid any major fallout with the European

Authors: William Choong and Sharon Seah, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute The wilderness years of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the Quad), after its initial inception during the 2004 Asian tsunami, are over. The latest summit in Tokyo reaffirmed its mission as a ‘force for good’ while promising a broad array of Indo-Pacific cyber security, maritime awareness, pandemic recovery, space, climate change and infrastructure initiatives. At the recent IISS Shangri-La Dialogue held in Singapore, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida and US Defence Secretary Lloyd Austin emphasised the importance of the Quad in promoting a ‘free and open Indo-Pacific’ and the need to cooperate with ASEAN to achieve these goals. But the group will need to consider the region’s needs to get support for its vision. Meeting for their fourth leaders’ summit in just over a year, the Quad appears to have finally turned a corner with more coherent and cohesive language directed at upholding the so-called rules-b

Author: Abdul Rahman Yaacob, ANU As the Australian Labor Party forms its foreign and defence policies after its recent election victory, resetting Australia’s engagement with Southeast Asia is a key concern for the new government. Australia has identified the region as an area of direct strategic interest. Constructive engagement is crucial for Australia to influence the region in support of shared security interests. Labor signalled the importance of Southeast Asia during the election campaign , promising additional aid worth AUD$470 million (US$330 million) to the region and the creation of the Office of Southeast Asia within the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). But perhaps it is time to examine how Southeast Asia and members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) view Australia. Australia is not considered to have significant economic influence over ASEAN. Only 0.5 per cent of respondents to a recent survey of ASEAN elites by the Institute of Sou