Today Trends

Author: M Chatib Basri, University of Indonesia Last week’s G20 Leaders’ Summit in Bali illustrated the geopolitical challenges weighing on multilateralism. Earlier it looked like the G20 might fissure amid divides between its membership on the Ukraine conflict. Simply convening the G20 in Bali this year has been a major and underappreciated challenge for Indonesia. That achieved, this year’s G20 could be remembered for being the place where a floor was put underneath some critical bilateral relationships, while building a base for renewed multilateral cooperation on economic challenges. It helps that the key players, not least Indonesia, understood the economic stakes of failure. Asia, more than any other region, has the most to lose from the retreat from globalisation and the bifurcation of the global economy that might emerge from efforts to force ‘decoupling’ between the United States and China. The stakes will be equally high in 2023 when the region hosts a suite of importan

Author: Shrishti Rana, University of St Andrews Nepal heads toward an election on 20 November 2022. This will be the second democratic election following the promulgation of its new constitution in 2015 — which provided a framework to institutionalise peace and the democratisation process. If the upcoming polls proceed peacefully, as is most likely, Nepal will have completed four cycles of democratic elections, which is a chief indicators of stable peace. Two days after the election, on 22 November, Nepal will celebrate the 17th anniversary of the signing of its first peace agreement , signed in 2005. Nepal’s peace process has received limited international attention despite its relative success. What international experts and peace scholars find puzzling about Nepal’s durable process is how a country with minimal resources and great complexities transformed violent conflict into stable peace. To explain Nepal’s peace process, it is important to look at its history of armed insur

Author: Marian Seliga, J&T Bank In response to anti-government protests that broke out in Kazakhstan in January 2022, Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev has called for reforms that might significantly change the country’s political landscape. Tokayev signed a decree on constitutional amendments on 17 September that limits presidential tenure to a single seven-year term and called for snap elections to be held on 20 November. In September, Tokayev instructed his officials to prepare a new reform package that further ‘decentralises and distributes’ power between the government, ministries and regional heads ( akimats ). It envisages a mixed electoral system, simplified party registration procedures and increased regional independence. Tokayev has initiated the democratic process of expanding the powers of parliament while limiting the powers of the president. But it would be wrong to believe that Tokayev intends to completely democratise this Central Asian country, rule

Author: Seong-Hyon Lee, George H W Bush Foundation for US–China Relations During the tenure of former South Korean president Moon Jae-in, South Korea became one of the most anti-China nations in the world. Yet the Moon government was actually the most ‘pro-China’ government in South Korea’s history. China’s reaction to South Korea’s deployment of the US Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-ballistic missile defence system is often cited as the primary reason for the decline in South Korea–China relations. But Moon’s policy indecisiveness and inconsistent dialogue with China are also significant factors, despite often being overlooked. Moon was widely regarded as a ‘ pro-China ’ leader in South Korea. Yet South Korea–China relations under Moon hit their lowest point in 30 years of diplomatic relations. Despite Moon’s repeated invitations, Chinese President Xi Jinping did not visit South Korea during Moon’s presidency or engage in a single video conference during the

Author: Terence Ho, NUS In August 2022, Singapore announced a new Overseas Networks & Expertise (ONE) Pass to attract top global talent to live and work in Singapore. This is the latest salvo in a longstanding ‘war for talent’ that Singapore has been engaged in for decades. Singapore’s ONE Pass has been introduced at a time when several other countries have announced new work and talent visas. The United Kingdom unveiled a High Potential Individual Visa and Germany a Chancenkarte (opportunity card). The Chancenkarte will even allow skilled migrants to enter the country without having already secured a job. Singapore’s ONE Pass targets the narrower apex of high-income earners — those with regular monthly incomes of at least S$30,000 ($US21,128) — as well as those with ‘outstanding achievements’ across the arts and culture, sports, science and technology, and research and academia. Some may question the necessity of this new pass, given that Singapore already has a relativel

Author: Fan Yang, Deakin University Weixin was launched in January 2011 by Chinese tech giant Tencent. It is now the primary digital platform for Mandarin speakers, with almost 1.3 billion monthly active accounts as of April 2022. WeChat is not Weixin. Weixin and WeChat are two interoperable platforms within Weixin’s ecosystem — both of which are subject to the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) governance ‘at home’ and ‘abroad’. Weixin user accounts are linked to Chinese mobile phone numbers and are subject to the ‘ Standards of Weixin Account Usage ’. WeChat user accounts are associated with non-Chinese mobile phone numbers and are governed by WeChat’s ‘ Acceptable Use Policy ’. Users with different memberships can communicate with each other with the exception that publications by official overseas WeChat accounts (not affiliated with Chinese businesses) cannot be viewed by Weixin users. The difference between the two user policies suggests that WeChat users are not completely re

Authors: Dharish David, SIM Global Education and B Rajeshwari, Niiti Consulting The Indian government’s Personal Data Protection Bill of 2019 (PDP Bill) was withdrawn in August 2022 after criticism from the opposition, tech giants and civil society. The government admitted the Bill could not address digital privacy in a country poised to become a US$1 trillion digital economy by 2026 . After the Supreme Court of India declared privacy a fundamental right in 2017, the country saw two drafts of the PDP Bill — the first in 2018 and another in 2019. The draft 2018 Bill authorised 10 national agencies to intercept, monitor, or decrypt any digital information. The PDP draft Bill in 2019 granted central government agencies the same powers over personal and non-personal data. The 2019 draft Bill stoked criticism for the excessive powers granted to central government agencies to access personal data without consent. Former justice of the Supreme Court of India, Bellur Narayanaswamy Srikr

Author: Andrew Harding, NUS Malaysians heaved sighs of relief when former prime minister Najib Razak’s attempts to overturn his conviction finally failed in the Federal Court on 23 August 2022. This was more than two years after his conviction for criminal breach of trust, abuse of power and money laundering. Najib was convicted for misappropriating RM42 million (US$9.5 million) from a former subsidiary of Malaysia’s scandal-mired sovereign wealth fund , 1MDB. His lawyers had used every device known to the law to prolong the case as long as they could. Even as the ring closed on Najib, a social media post was used to argue that the Chief Justice should recuse herself. Najib changed his lawyers twice close to the final hearing. He claimed a further adjournment as if preparing the ground to argue he did not get a fair hearing — after more than four years of argument before the courts. His lawyers applied to admit new evidence and postpone the case by a further three to four months. B

Authors: Phan Le and Hai Thanh Nguyen, CIEM The CEO of Samsung Electronics met with Vietnamese Prime Minister Pham Minh Chinh and announced a US$850 million investment to manufacture semiconductor components in Thai Nguyen province on 5 August 2022. The investment will make Vietnam one of only four countries — alongside South Korea, China and the United States — that produce semiconductors for the world’s largest memory chipmaker. Vietnam’s selection over more developed locations speaks volumes about the country’s rising importance in the semiconductor value chain. Vietnam is not a newcomer to the semiconductor industry. The country’s first semiconductor plant, Z181, was established in 1979 to produce and export semiconductor components to the Eastern Bloc during the Cold War. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the ensuing trade embargo put an end to the country’s first attempt at developing semiconductor capability. Yet the desire to enter the global semiconductor value chai

Author: Daniel Mitchum, New York South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol is feeling the heat of the recent restrictions by the US Department of Commerce on technology exports to China. While the export controls could hamstring South Korea’s lucrative semiconductor industry, they are emblematic of a larger issue — that balancing between the United States and China is becoming more difficult for Seoul. It may not matter that South Korea was granted a one-year amnesty on semiconductor exports to China. In an increasingly bipolar world, Yoon is likely not up to the task of balancing engagement with China. South Korea’s proclivity for balancing its security engagement with Washington and economic engagement with Beijing met a harsh reality in 2016 during the Moon presidency. Moon Jae-in was elected president during a high point in ROK–China relations. But when Seoul procured the US-made Terminal High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD) missile defence system, Beijing retaliated. Concerned