Today Trends

Authors: Sun Ryung Park and Charlotte Bull, UBC In January 2023, South Korean President Yoon Seok-yeol reaffirmed his willingness to reinstate the nuclear power policies that his predecessor, Moon Jae-in, had sought to scrap. But this position raises questions about South Korea’s green energy transition. ‘As a key means to bolster our energy security while reducing our reliance on fossil fuels, we must turn our attention to nuclear power and clean hydrogen’, Yoon said . He also added , ‘Korea’s nuclear power [ecosystem] had faced challenges due to the previous phase-out policies, but we will expand nuclear power generation’. Yoon’s nuclear U-turn is not entirely new. Since his presidential campaign in 2022, Yoon has championed nuclear power as a clean energy source. Instead of promoting solar, wind or hydroelectric energy , he has called for the construction of more nuclear reactors as a key tool to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. In July 2022, Yoon reiterated the need to emphas

Authors: Viet Dung Trinh, University of Queensland and Huy Hai Do, Hanoi University The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013 by Chinese President Xi Jinping, is considered an ambitious long-term strategy to promote the expansion of Chinese influence by providing countries in the region with aid and infrastructure investment. But in contrast with some Southeast Asian states which have largely embraced the BRI with open arms, Vietnam has adopted a hedging approach. Hedging is characterised by three contradicting yet complementary features — avoiding opposition against and dependence on a rising power, engaging in both deference and defiance with a threatening power, and diversifying relations with other major powers. Vietnam’s strategy towards China’s BRI displays all three of these features of hedging. While Vietnam’s endorsement of the BRI shows its desire to avoid confrontation with China, Hanoi is cognisant of the risk of economic dependence on Beijing and the opaci

Author: Monika Chaudhary, IIHMR University In February 2023, India’s government announced that the Geological Survey of India found around 5.9 million tonnes of lithium reserves in the Salal-Haimana region of Jammu and Kashmir. Lithium is sometimes termed ‘white gold’ for its strategic importance as an essential metal in electrification. But India faces several challenges capitalising on its lithium deposits. The discovery of lithium in Jammu and Kashmir expands India’s known lithium reserves. Lithium deposits have previously been found in Karnataka, Kerala and Rajasthan. Australia is the largest producer of lithium in the world with 50 per cent of global supplies, while Chile, Argentina and China account for 23 per cent, 14 per cent and 12 per cent of production respectively. Lithium is used in portable electronics, electric vehicles, energy storage systems, medical devices and satellites. Lithium batteries can enable a shift to clean and renewable energy sources that would resul

Author: Ryan Manuel, Bilby Chinese President Xi Jinping had only just launched his third term in power when questions about his leadership began to circulate at home and abroad. China’s complete turnaround on its zero-COVID policy was so rapid and extraordinary that it caught almost everyone by surprise. But China’s course correction was signalled well before policy shifted in December 2022. In February 2022 responsibility for controlling COVID-19 was devolved to local governments, which made China’s shift from ‘dynamic clearing’ or zero-COVID possible. Before the 20th Party Congress, the Yangtze River Delta was slated as the centrepiece of China’s COVID-19 recovery. After the Party Congress, local governments began to loosen restrictions a week before official central word. But the national scale of the reversal was more surprising than the implication that some areas could follow different policies. Following the zero-COVID turnaround, there was central silence until February,

Author: Parul Bakshi, JNU Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has pushed Japan to reevaluate its energy strategy once again. A sharp rise in the price of LNG, a lack of energy alternatives to reduce reliance on Russian LNG imports and Tokyo’s commitment to phasing out Russian coal and oil imports — all while ensuring Japan’s energy security — are making this reevaluation difficult. Even measures such as wearing turtlenecks to reduce energy consumption have been suggested. The Japanese government is unsurprisingly using the uncertainty around energy security as a reason to proactively push its nuclear energy policy. The policy can be traced to former prime minister Shinzo Abe’s administration. In 2012, following the Fukushima nuclear disaster, Abe put nuclear energy back on the table as a potential critical energy source for Japan. Nuclear power has been touted as an important pillar in enhancing Japan’s energy self-sufficiency . Its use is also proposed as a way to reduce greenhouse g

Author: Maholopa Laveil, Lowy Institute The Papua New Guinea (PNG) government continues to punish the non-competitive sectors within its economy. In 2022, the government introduced a ‘dominant player’ levy and, in 2023, replaced the levy by raising the corporate income tax rate (CIT) on banks from 30 to 45 per cent. An overhang of struggling revenues from the pandemic and the perceived political popularity of targeting large companies are likely to have influenced the decision to tax large companies. A former Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade senior official and current advisor to the PNG Treasurer is said to have advocated for the levy . Initially, two non-competitive sectors were targeted. In the telecommunications sector, Digicel holds 91 per cent of the market share for unique mobile subscribers. In the banking sector, the Bank of South Pacific (BSP) holds a 65 per cent market share in outstanding loans. Kina Bank has a 22 per cent market share and the Austr

Author: Editorial Board, ANU Confusion, miscommunication, lies, crude posturing, finger-pointing— last month’s ‘balloongate’ was the contemporary US–China relationship in microcosm. As Paul Heer writes  in the first of this week’s two lead articles , ‘[w]e now know that this rapid sequence of events reflected a rush to judgement and action before the facts were clear’. The balloon’s drift over North America wasn’t the deliberate provocation it was initially cast as — more likely the result of a spy balloon blown off-course — though in doing so it ‘exposed a Chinese intelligence program that would violate international law by operating within other countries’ territorial airspace’. The peril to US national security from the balloon’s overflight didn’t match the overheated rhetoric. But it was alarming in how it revealed ‘mutual distrust, latent hostility, a failure to communicate and the adverse impact of internal politics on how the two sides deal with each other’, writes Heer, an

Author: Paul Heer, Chicago Council on Global Affairs Washington and Beijing’s response to the appearance of a Chinese surveillance balloon over the United States in February 2023 illustrates several aspects of the current US–China relationship that will make it very difficult to reverse the downward spiral in bilateral ties. The episode displayed mutual distrust, latent hostility, a failure to communicate and the adverse impact of internal politics on how the two sides deal with each other. It is worth recalling the speed with which the episode unfolded. The presence of the balloon over US airspace was publicly revealed on Thursday 2 February. The next day, Beijing acknowledged that it was a Chinese weather balloon that had drifted off course and expressed ‘regrets’ for this ‘unintended’ and ‘unexpected situation’. But US Secretary of State Antony Blinken postponed a planned visit to Beijing , which was intended to be a follow up on discussions between Chinese and US leaders at th

Author: Harrison Prétat, Center for Strategic and International Studies Speaking at the Aspen Institute in December 2022, National Security Council Coordinator for Indo-Pacific Affairs Kurt Campbell highlighted the need to ‘build the guardrails’ to keep US–China relations from ‘moving into destabilising areas’. To do so, Washington needs to establish regular dialogue to dispel Beijing’s worst fears about US intentions and disincentivise assertive and risky behaviour. The sentiment among analysts in Beijing largely accords with public messaging from Chinese officials and media. They fear the United States is adopting a Cold War-style, zero-sum strategy that aims to stifle China’s rise . The Quad, AUKUS and even the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework (IPEF) are viewed as the beginnings of a US-led bloc that will constrain China. Not all Chinese analysts share these views, but even those sceptical find it hard to convince others that the United States is not arranging an ideologically dri

Author: Huiyao Wang, Southwestern University of Finance and Economics At the end of 2022, 150 countries and 32 international organisations had signed more than 200 cooperation documents related to joint infrastructure projects with China under the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The 2022 report to the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China noted that China should promote opening up to the world and development. Anchoring the BRI in a multilateral framework could help China achieve these goals. The BRI is an ambitious plan by China to build global infrastructure while connecting itself to trading partners. Since its launch, there have been diverse responses to it from the international community. Some countries welcomed the opportunity to form new trade routes, while others — notably, the United States — depicted it as a sign of China’s efforts to overturn the world order. Doubts about the Initiative also emerged around issues related to the environment, labour stand