Today Trends

Author: Michael G Plummer, JHU The US dollar is on a tear. According to the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’s US Dollar Index , it has risen by approximately 13 per cent in 2022 against a broad basket of currencies. It is at its highest level since the 2008–09 global financial crisis (GFC). Asian currencies have not been spared. The Japanese yen and the Chinese RMB are at two-decade and 14-year lows, respectively. In 2022, the US dollar has appreciated by one-fifth relative to the South Korean won and by over one-tenth against the Malaysian ringgit, Philippine peso and Thai baht. There are many reasons for the underlying strength of the dollar. Financial markets respond to risk and reward — and these are both changing in support of investments in the United States. Heightened risk in the global marketplace leads to a ‘flight to safety’ phenomenon in favour of US assets, even if the main shock originates in the US market as it did during the GFC. Risk in the global economy is unp

Authors: Donald R Rothwell, ANU and Mai Sato, Monash University Throughout 2022, Australia–Japan military cooperation has been the subject of renewed focus. On 22 October, during Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s visit to Perth, the two countries announced several new initiatives, including a renewed bilateral Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation . Both Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese and Kishida highlighted the January 2022 Reciprocal Access Agreement (RAA) as symbolic of the growing defence cooperation between Australia and Japan. The RAA is a treaty-level agreement between Australia and Japan that reflects the outcome of negotiations that started in 2014. A significant stumbling block in those negotiations was Japan’s use of the death penalty and Australia’s opposition to it. That remains an issue for the Albanese government, which inherited the RAA from the Morrison government, and is currently under review by the Australian Parliament’s Joint Standing

Author: Editorial Board, ANU The world’s two largest powers are on a collision course. Strategic competition between the United States and China is ratcheting up, driven by both countries’ nationalism and psychologies of exceptionalism and righteousness which make it difficult to show weakness or back down in the face of perceived affronts to their dignity or interests. Guardrails that protect against deterioration of bilateral relations, and even armed conflict, are being dismantled. Earlier hopes of cooperation, at least on global collective action problems like pandemic management and recovery and climate change, have all but disappeared. The inflationary and other economic costs of trade and technology decoupling are being disregarded. There’s plenty of blame to go around. President Xi Jinping doing away with term limits and taking China down a path of illiberalism is no longer a matter for China alone given its share of the global economy and integration into it. The global m

Author: Qingguo Jia, Stanford University Today the possibility of consolidating an inclusive regional architecture for comprehensive security in the Asia Pacific has become almost inconceivable. This is because on-going China–US tension appears to have excluded that option. Security personnel keep watch outside the Great Hall of the People before the closing ceremony of the 20th National Congress of the Communist Party of China in Beijing, China, 22 October 2022. (Photo: Reuters/Tingshu Wang). The United States has been busy consolidating its old military alliances and putting together new ones in the region in order to compete with and contain China. China has reacted by enhancing its ties with Russia even after the outbreak of Russia–Ukraine war and telling its neighbours to stay away from China–US conflicts. As a result, instead of an inclusive, regionwide security architecture, the Asia Pacific region has ended up with a set of security arrangements that is increasingly frag

Author: Narayanan Ganesan, Hiroshima City University Myanmar’s coup leader and de facto head of state, General Min Aung Hlaing, has paid two visits to Russia in 2022. Such visits are the culmination of bilateral ties that have grown since 2014. Relations between Myanmar and Russia are military-focussed. Myanmar has long relied on Russia for the postgraduate training of its military officers, especially those in the air force. While China has proved to be a great power ally at times when Myanmar was subject to widespread international sanctions, which have been imposed intermittently and to varying degrees since 1962, better ties with Russia afford the military junta the opportunity to interact with international leaders and gain international recognition. Ties with Moscow also allow the military to diversify weapon procurements away from China, its traditional provider of developmental aid and weaponry. The military is suspicious of China’s support for the Wa, Kokang and Kachin et

Authors: Ajay Mahal and Sumit Kane, University of Melbourne The Control of Tobacco Products and Smoking Bill 2022 currently under parliamentary examination marks a dramatic change in Malaysia’s strategy to limit tobacco consumption. Among its provisions are the prohibition of the sale, purchase and possession of cigarettes, tobacco and vaping products as well as a ban on cigarette smoking, tobacco use and vaping among those born after 1 January 2007. Accompanying these provisions are enforcement mechanisms, including monetary fines for users. If the bill passes , Malaysia would join New Zealand as the only other country that has introduced legislation to promote a ‘generational end’ to tobacco use. It is not hard to see why Malaysia would want to pursue legislation to limit smoking among younger age groups and future generations. More than one-fifth of Malaysians over 15 years of age currently smoke, the average age of smoking initiation is 18 years old and there are high rates of

Author: Anthony V Rinna, Sino-NK The dissonance between the two conflict-ridden ends of Russia’s periphery continues to shrink as the situation in Ukraine exerts an increasing influence on the security situation on the Korean Peninsula. The development of North Korea–Russia relations since the beginning of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine suggests multilateralism aimed at curbing the security threat posed by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) will come under increasing strain. The strengthening of DPRK–Russia ties since the beginning of 2022 indicates that Russia may be shifting away from asserting compliance with the UN-based international sanctions regime against Pyongyang. Russia now seems in favour of explicitly violating UN sanctions as a matter of public policy. The DPRK–Russia relationship had in recent years been amicable if somewhat distant before it ground to a halt due to North Korea’s stringent border closure in 2020. But Russia’s full-scale in

Author: Mark van Loon, Seoul Sarawak’s autonomy has been controversial from the start. One of the four founding states of Malaysia, Sarawak was granted freedom to self-govern by the British Crown in July 1963 and joined the Malaysian Federation later that year with Sabah, Malaya and Singapore. London thought that, during the Cold War, dealing with one federation was more manageable than with four small independent nations. The Malaysia Agreement signed in 1963 resulted in the formation of Malaysia, with on-paper autonomy for the states (Singapore left in 1965). But former prime minister Mahathir Mohamed pursued a policy of power centralisation at the expense of the states from 1980–2003. Many people in Sarawak and Sabah are disappointed with the broken promises made by leaders in Kuala Lumpur. To appease the situation, the central government amended the Constitution to promote the status of Sarawak and Sabah in late 2021. They are now two of the three entities that make up the fed

Author: Claudia Chia Yi En, NUS The signing of a provisional deal between Russia and the Taliban in September 2022 marks the Taliban’s first known major international economic deal. But beyond the announcement that Russia will supply gas, oil and wheat to Afghanistan, the payment and pricing details have not been released to the public. How the two countries will navigate international sanctions and their exclusion from the global banking system remains unclear. This deal comes against the backdrop of active trade talks between the Taliban and its regional neighbours and Russia’s discussions with several non-Western countries on long-term oil contracts. The economic value of Afghanistan–Russia trade relations might be dismal, but more bilateral engagements and partnerships are a positive diplomatic asset for Russia and the Taliban. They show the international community that neither country is isolated. The Taliban has been striving to diversify its trading partners and enhance rel

Authors: Brittany Morreale, USAF and Purnendra Jain, NUS The African continent has emerged as a new geostrategic playground for Asian aid donors. The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation in November 2021 and the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) in August 2022 marked the eighth occurrence of China and Japan’s respective high-level African conferences. At the geostrategic level, Japan and China’s investments in Africa offer insight into the shifting balance of power toward Asia in the 21st century. But a deeper analysis reveals the uniqueness of the TICAD process and Japan’s partnerships with African states. Japan’s core development principles of ownership, partnership and human security set its African development partnerships apart. As the curtain fell on TICAD 8, held in Tunisia in August 2022, Japan’s deepening commitment to African states stood out against a backdrop of international and domestic turmoil. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s US$30