Today Trends

Author: Vera Yuen, HKU Hong Kong has experienced a series of unexpected political developments since 2019. The government proposed a new extradition law that would have allowed Hong Kong residents to be extradited to mainland China, which triggered months of protests and social unrest. In mid-2020, the Chinese government passed a new national security law in Hong Kong and arrested a number of opposition candidates and activists. Shortly after, the Hong Kong government postponed its Legislative Council election for a year and in 2021 amended electoral rules to further curb the influence of the opposition . Political disputes, among other factors such as cramped living spaces, have pushed the people of Hong Kong to consider migration. According to a Chinese University of Hong Kong survey conducted in September 2020, 44 per cent of respondents indicated they would emigrate if they had the chance. Of those respondents, 35 per cent had acted to prepare for the move. These percentages

Author: Yasuo Takao, Curtin University In the parliamentary session that ended on 16 June 2021, Japan failed to pass a much anticipated bill to promote understanding of the LGBTIQA+ (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, gender diverse, intersex, queer, asexual and questioning) community. The ruling Liberal Democratic Party’s (LDP) Special Mission Committee on Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity formulated draft ‘LGBT’ legislation, which addressed concerns from the main opposition Constitutional Democratic Party and others. While the law was expected to be passed before the Tokyo 2020 Olympic Games, the LDP ultimately decided not to submit the bill. A small number of conservative LDP lawmakers objected to the bill , warning of the danger of a ‘collapse of family values’. Another obstacle was political interference. Senior LDP members openly expressed their concerns that enacting the bill during the Diet session would not help the LDP to shore up its conservative voter base in the

Author: Jayant Menon, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute A silver lining amid the unfolding tragedy of the COVID-19 pandemic has been the acceleration of the digital economy. Lockdowns and social distancing measures have hastened the adoption of technologies of the Fourth Industrial Revolution (4IR) that enable work-from-home arrangements, remote learning, telemedicine and other novel forms of service delivery . While this acceleration is generally welcome, there is a concern that it may increase inequality within and between countries. The adoption rate of these technologies favours more developed countries, which threatens to widen the digital divide in Asia . Digital infrastructure in developing countries is limited and access to what is available can vary by income class. The urban poor may not have the financial means to fully participate and technology may not reach rural or isolated regions. The threat to their jobs is more concerning as automation and robotics take hold initiall

Author: Yuri Okina, Japan Research Institute The Japanese labour market has undergone significant change since the early 2010s when the baby boomer generation began to retire, expanding opportunities for women, the elderly and other groups. But COVID-19’s economic impact is challenging the gains of the past decade. The employment rate has reversed its upward trend, declining along with salaries and hours worked, while unemployment rose from 2.4 per cent in 2019 to 2.9 per cent in June 2020. Looking at COVID-19’s impact on the Japanese labour market, there are two key takeaways. The first is that the increase in unemployment is modest compared to the decline in economic activity. Many non-regular workers — disproportionately women , youth or older workers — who lost their jobs during the first state of emergency in April 2020 chose not to look for new employment and so fell out of the labour force. This partially explains why the unemployment rate remained low. The Japanese governm

Author: Justin Hastings, University of Sydney Any spread of COVID-19 in North Korea will prove disastrous. Its healthcare system is unable to cope. Medicine and medical equipment are difficult to import due to sanctions, the border closure, the departure of humanitarian agencies and the lack of foreign currency. Even if (as North Korea claims) there is no COVID-19 in the country, North Korea’s economy is undoubtedly doing it tough. Hard data about North Korea is difficult to come by. Since the January 2020 border closure , there have been multiple signs of economic hardship, at least in parts of the economy that rely on imports and exports. China’s reported trade with North Korea was down 80 per cent in 2020 from the previous year, although the first half of 2021 was a little better , potentially due to greater needs for fertiliser. In 2020, North Korean fishing fleets essentially disappeared , possibly due to concerns that movement would bring in COVID-19. Without imported goods,

Author: Editorial Board, ANU As the world looks upon the horrifying images of Indonesia’s COVID-19 crisis, many naturally wonder whether, or how, the country will be diminished at home and on the world stage by its experience and its management of the pandemic. That perhaps reflects an underestimation of the resilience of Indonesian society, the country’s economic fundamentals and, as Liam Gammon writes in our lead article this week , the political status quo. Indonesia’s capacity to steer a steady path to recovery from its current COVID-19 travails and secure the future of its development will, nonetheless, be under increasingly intense international scrutiny over the coming year as it assumes the presidency of the G20. Hosting the summit in Bali is just one aspect. Navigating the crafting of an agenda that will secure its standing as a global player with the moral authority to make a difference to its own and the world’s recovery and development outcomes is a far more important o

Author: Liam Gammon, ANU Two genres of viral video encapsulate Indonesia’s devastating wave of COVID-19 infections over the past six weeks. In the one most familiar to international audiences, the pandemic’s victims struggle to breathe in tents erected on hospital carparks, or desperate family members go from hospital to hospital looking for somewhere with capacity to treat their loved ones. In the other, municipal police meet resistance from irate petty traders flouting the lockdown imposed by President Joko Widodo in early July. A coffee seller in West Java declined to pay a 5 million Rupiah (AU$470) fine for trading, reasoning that he’d be better off financially if he accepted the alternative of three days in prison. At a restaurant in North Sumatra, police officers were sprayed with a hose by the owner. Viewed side by side these scenes illustrate how Indonesia’s government is split between two apparently irreconcilable political goals. It needs to be seen to be mitigating the

Author: Naohiro Yashiro, Showa Women’s University In June 2021, Japan’s Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy promoted plans for an optional four-day workweek in its annual economic policy guideline. While the policy creates substantial employment benefits for Japan’s aging workforce, the announcement has divided Japanese workers. Young workers and couples with small children welcome fewer working hours a week, while middle-aged male workers want to avoid their overtime payments from being reduced by fewer workdays. Employers also worry about increasing hourly wage costs without an equivalent productivity growth. If the plan reduces salaries then it may harm the economy by reducing consumption. The key issue is that the program is optional, meaning that the actual effect will likely be limited. The rapid development of information and communication technologies risks creating a digital divide among middle-aged workers. The government intends to take a larger role in upskilling Japa

Author: Toshitaka Sekine, Hitotsubashi University More than eight years have passed since the Bank of Japan (BOJ) began its aggressive Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQE) program in April 2013. Despite subsequent efforts made by the Bank, such as the adoption of negative interest rates in January 2016 and yield curve control in September 2016, it has yet to achieve its 2 per cent inflation target — the most recent figures put consumer price index inflation small negative. This raises the question of what policy options are left for the BOJ if it needs to further increase monetary stimulus. In these circumstances easy monetary policy would remain important, but the central bank would have limited room to manoeuvre. Other elements of the policy mix (or the three arrows strategy of former prime minister Shinzo Abe ) would need to play a major role — namely, fiscal policy and a strategy for economic growth. Any analysis of Japan’s easy monetary policy must focus on

Author: Kevin Chen, ACI For developing countries in Southeast Asia, growing global interest in their infrastructure needs has been cause for both excitement and concern. In 2021, the G7 announced its support for the US-led ‘Build Back Better World’ (B3W) initiative, while the European Union unveiled its own ‘Globally Connected Europe’ infrastructure strategy. These initiatives aim to address the US$40 trillion infrastructure gap in developing countries, yet they also raise geopolitical concerns by seemingly competing with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The last thing Southeast Asian governments want is to be caught in a geopolitical crossfire over investment choices. But recipient countries have more to look forward to than to fear. New Western initiatives can supplement the BRI’s offerings and encourage Beijing to address its shortcomings. Above all, these alternatives offer Southeast Asian governments more political space to choose a path that furthers their development