Today Trends

Author: Robin Vochelet, NUS Days before his 70th birthday on 10 February, Lee Hsien Loong announced that he wouldn’t be stepping down from his position as Singaporean Prime Minister. Lee had previously marked this date as the end of his tenure as the city-state’s prime minister and leading figure of the People’s Action Party (PAP). The leadership transition process garnered attention in the aftermath of the 2015 general election. It falls under the mandate of the fourth generation (4G) leadership group, a group of leaders who will ostensibly take over after Lee’s departure. Although Lee announced that he would retain the premiership through the COVID-19 crisis in July 2020, the 4G leadership group remained committed to appointing a successor by the 10 February deadline. Plans for succession had already stopped a year earlier in April 2021 after Deputy Prime Minister, Heng Swee Keat — widely understood to be Lee’s intended successor — stepped aside from the 4G leadership group.

Author: Alexey D Muraviev, Curtin University Following the launch of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, the United States, Europe and some Asia Pacific nations have imposed an extraordinarily tight sanctions regime on Moscow. Although the United States and its allies refused to counter Russia’s offensive militarily, the severity of the new sanctions regime can arguably be seen as a declaration of economic war on the Russian state. Among the first Russian assets to be targeted were its massive national defence industry and associated banks. But it remains to be seen how these new sanctions will impact Russia’s capacity to export defence technologies and systems to the Indo-Pacific. The Indo-Pacific defence market is among Moscow’s top defence business priorities. Over the past 20 years, Russia has, alongside the United States, consolidated its position as one of the two principal providers of defence capabilities to Indo-Pacific partners and clients while also establ

Author: Alan Alexandroff, Global Summitry Project The G20 summit will take place in Bali in November 2022 under the theme ‘Recover Together, Recover Stronger’. Indonesia had hoped to use its G20 presidency to encourage all countries to work together towards a more sustainable world recovery as the global pandemic continues. But the framing for this year’s summit occurred before Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine. Now the critical question is how to deal with Russia — as a member of the G20 — and its aggression against Ukraine. Many G20 members, particularly the G7 members, have strongly condemned Russia and supported serious economic sanctions. Other G20 members, particularly China and India, have abstained from condemning Russia in the various UN resolutions, showing divisions in the G20 membership. Almost immediately after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Indonesian officials suggested that the Indonesian G20 would seek to avoid the issue. As its co-sherpa, Dian Triansyah Djani

Author: Stuti Bhatnagar, ANU While largely a European conflict, Russia’s assault against Ukraine has significance for South Asia too. It has brought to light India’s status as a regional power and exposed its limitations when exercising this power. India has repeatedly abstained from voting against Russia in the United Nations and is yet to publicly condemn Russia for its attack on Ukraine. In an explanation of its vote, India supported the international community’s call for a ‘cessation of violence and hostilities’ and ‘stressed the need for diplomacy and dialogue to resolve the crisis’. New Delhi is constrained by its relationship with Moscow and has geopolitical stakes in this crisis, explaining its cautious approach so far. India and Russia have enjoyed a special relationship even prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union. While India practiced non-alignment, its relationship with the Soviet Union flourished, visible in agreements including the 1971 Treaty of Friendship .

Authors: Shiro Armstrong and Yose Rizal Damuri Russia’s invasion of Ukraine makes the cooperation agenda for pandemic recovery much harder. It has also threatened to derail the G20 summit altogether. But the global community has shown its ability to rapidly coordinate economic sanctions and present a largely united front against a war of aggression. Despite the tragedy from the conflict and its effect to the global economy, this also underlines the security dimension of economic interdependence. The coordinated economic and financial sanctions on Russia appear to be imposing huge costs to the Russian economy. Whether they help in ending the conflict depends on other factors, but the sanctions have made Russia internalise some of the costs of its aggression. Economic sanctions and trade measures can help to constrain bad behaviour and give the global community non-military tools to fight back in the extreme against military aggression. But the collective action can only be effective

Authors: Trissia Wijaya, Murdoch University and Samuel Nursamsu, SMERU On 15 February 2022, President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo signed a law cementing the legal basis to develop Nusantara, Indonesia’s new capital city. The ambitious project envisions a smart city at the nexus of environment and technology, which will be located in East Kalimantan and inaugurated in 2024. Underlying the plan is an ideological commitment to urban growth as the high road to sustainable and even development. The government’s decision to relocate the capital has been a subject of contention. Critics maintain that the plan was rushed through without adequate public consultation , raising suspicions that Nusantara’s development is actually an attempt to build Jokowi’s political legacy . Concerns about the project’s environmental implications are widespread. Many have also cast doubts on whether Nusantara can attract investors and to what extent the state budget can cover the entire cost. The underlying pr

Author: Danilo Araña Arao, University of the Philippines Diliman The Philippine election system includes a party-list system intended to ensure that 20 per cent of House of Representatives seats are occupied by marginalised and underrepresented groups like the urban poor or indigenous communities. But what is supposed to benefit the poor is instead ending up with the rich. In Philippine election cycles, media coverage tends to focus on the presidential and senatorial elections. In 2022, the presidential race has received even more media attention as Ferdinand ‘Bongbong’ Marcos Jr , son of the late dictator Ferdinand Marcos, remains the frontrunner in a recent voter survey. Little attention is given to the party-list election, despite its purpose of providing the marginalised and underrepresented with a voice. In 2022, 177 party-list groups are vying for 63 seats . According to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), the party-list system allows ‘small political parties and margin

Author: Anna Kireeva, MGIMO The summit in early February between Russian President Vladimir Putin and his Chinese counterpart Xi Jinping during the Beijing 2022 Winter Olympics came amid yet another crisis in Russia’s relations with the West. Putin and Xi had not met since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, but the meeting highlighted a common desire to deepen cooperation. The major takeaways were in geopolitics and energy. China demonstrated a strong understanding of Russia’s security concerns over NATO but there were no fundamental developments. China voiced its endorsement of Moscow’s policy vis-a-vis NATO and the West — primarily due to shared concerns about US policy. The Russia–China joint statement declared that the relationship surpasses an alliance and that there are no prohibited areas of cooperation. The two states demonstrated diplomatic and political support for each other to amplify their international standing against the background of turbulent global and regional

Author: Jin Kyo Suh, KIEP After then South Korean deputy prime minister Hong Nam-ki remarked in December 2021 that, ‘the government aims to apply for membership in the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP)’, controversy over the country’s entry has been rekindled. South Korea had considered joining the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the CPTPP’s predecessor, since 2013 . Outgoing president Moon Jae-in once again expressed his interest in the CPTPP in his 2021 New Year’s address , but significant challenges still lay ahead. It was China’s and Taiwan’s applications to join the CPTPP that changed South Korea’s thinking. Joining the CPTPP after China would greatly raise entry costs since South Korea would have to negotiate its terms of accession with China, and be left out of the negotiations for China’s entry . The Moon government thus decided to apply for membership as soon as possible, proclaiming its intention to join more actively than ever. Th

Author: Myo Min, Yangon School of Political Science Since the military coup in Myanmar on 1 February 2021, several Western states have imposed sanctions on the junta. Yet regional powers like India and China have taken a more reserved approach to the unfolding situation. Though condemning the violence, neither India nor China have explicitly criticised the military or reinforced the legitimacy of the 2020 Myanmar general election. India’s cautious response to the military coup in Myanmar contrasts its previous policies. The primary motive behind India’s shift is to balance China’s influence and to contain insurgencies along the Indo-Myanmar border. India and Myanmar were initially close allies since the latter gained independence in 1948. But following the Myanmar military coup in 1962, the countries maintained a relationship characterised by stagnancy for the next two decades. The governments of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi viewed military rule in Myanmar as a threat to global