Today Trends

Author: Meg Keen, Lowy Institute Japan faces significant energy security hurdles over the next few decades. Energy shortfalls loom with the planned phase-out of inefficient coal power plants by 2030, losses of supply from terminating the Qatar Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) contract and uncertainties in the tight LNG market — particularly in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine . But a helping hand has been offered by Papua New Guinea (PNG). Japan is a big energy consumer and the largest LNG buyer in the world . A steady supply of fuel is needed to maintain the world’s third largest economy and underpin its COVID-19 recovery. Currently, Japan is one of PNG’s largest export markets but PNG supplies less than 5 per cent of Japanese LNG products. During a visit to Japan in late September 2022, PNG Prime Minister James Marape saw a win-win opportunity. He offered Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida favoured access to PNG’s new gas field developments . This is in addition to JX

Author: Mohmad Waseem Malla, MP-IDSA Amid news of US intelligence agencies alleging that China is actively assisting Saudi Arabia’s ballistic missile development program , evidence of Riyadh’s missile development facility and China’s role in its setup is lacking. Many are questioning whether this alleged collaboration marks a shift in China’s engagement with the Middle East from Iran towards Saudi Arabia. It is also unclear whether Beijing can sustain a balancing strategy toward these regional powers. Riyadh is shifting toward producing its own ballistic missiles to complement its purchases on the international arms market for three reasons. First is the strained Saudi–US relations. Former US president Donald Trump warned King Salman in 2018 that his rule ‘would not last two weeks’ without US support. In September 2021, the United States removed its advanced missile defence system and Patriot batteries from Saudi Arabia despite attacks by Iran-backed Houthi rebels. President J

Authors: Machiko Osawa, Japan Women’s University and Jeff Kingston, Temple University Telework is not a panacea for what ails the Japanese economy, but there are signs that the COVID-19 pandemic has shaken up corporate Japan as it sheds the hallowed hanko (personal seal used in lieu of signatures), leaves behind the fax and embraces remote work. But telework is also accentuating digital divides between larger and smaller firms, regular and non-regular workers, men and women, and urban and rural areas. A March 2022 government report that draws on a survey of 40,000 workers provides the most comprehensive data on telework in Japan. According to this report, the overall rate of telework increased from 13.3 per cent of employees in 2016 to 27.3 per cent in 2021. In Tokyo alone rates surged from 16.9 per cent in 2016 to 42.1 per cent by 2021. At large firms of over 1000 employees, 40.1 per cent of workers engaged in telework compared to 19.2 per cent in 2016. For workers at smaller fi

Author: Swagato Ganguly, Centre for Advanced Studies in India As India celebrates 75 years of independence, the integrated dynamics of pre-colonial Asia are slowly being revived. But India’s reconnection with Asia is partial at best. South Asia is among the least economically integrated regions in the world, having regressed in some respects since 1947. India has long been suspicious of the West and of free markets. By keeping markets on a tight leash, India refused to follow in the footsteps of the more freewheeling ways of East Asia’s ‘tiger’ economies. Independent India stressed self-reliance, autarky and import substitution while leaning towards state control of the economy. Economic crises have periodically triggered some degree of reform and deregulation but these have been tactical rather than strategic responses to India’s ongoing economic problems. Following ASEAN’s formation in 1967, India was approached to become a full dialogue partner in 1975 and 1980, but spurned thes

Author: Hiroshi Ono, Hitotsubashi University Working in Japan is full of inflexibilities. Flexible work arrangements, such as remote work and flexible work hours, remain low compared to other OECD countries . Digitalisation has been slow to launch and, even controlling for the state of Japan’s digital infrastructure, flexible work arrangements remain low . The problem is not just because of the poor state of digitalisation , but the ingrained work culture. The Prime Minister’s Office launched the Work Style Reform Action Plan in 2016, which helped build momentum towards creating a more flexible work culture, promoting work–life balance and improving overall productivity in the workplace. The number of employers offering flexible work practices, such as remote work and flexible work, has risen since its launch. But the core aspects of the inflexible work culture remain. Inflexibility may be rooted in collectivism. Yamagishi and associates argue that the tolerance for ‘free-riders

Author: Arun R Swamy, University of Guam India’s grand old party, the Indian National Congress (INC), has elected a new president . This should not be big news, but it is the first contested election in two decades and only the sixth in INC history. It is also the first time since 1998 that someone not named Gandhi has held the post. But the prospects of this exercise in party democracy reviving the INC are slim. As the tortuous process and predictable outcome make clear, the INC has still not overcome its dependence on one ruling dynasty. Its difficulties are deeply rooted in its history and practice of elevating a single leader to a position of charismatic authority beyond democratic accountability. This practice originates in the leadership that ‘Mahatma’ Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (no relation to today’s Gandhi dynasty) exercised over the independence movement and persists in part because India’s regional diversity makes it difficult for most leaders to appeal nationwide. Wi

Author: Bal Kama, ANU The relationship between Australia and the Autonomous Region of Bougainville is in repair mode following the visit of Australia’s Deputy Prime Minister and Defence Minister Richard Marles to Papua New Guinea (PNG) in October 2022 for negotiations over an Australia–PNG defence treaty. The rift originated from a press conference with PNG Prime Minister James Marape and Richard Marles. In response to a question on Australia’s position on Bougainville’s pending bid to obtain independence from PNG, Marles stated ‘our role is to support the Prime Minister and the government of Papua New Guinea in the decisions that it makes in respect of the future of Bougainville, and we stand ready to do that’. This statement was headlined in PNG’s media as ‘ Australia backs PNG on Bougainville ’. Bougainville’s President Ishmael Toroama responded to Marles’ statement, saying it indicated support for PNG and compromised Australia’s neutrality on the issue. President Toroama cit

Author: Andree Surianta, ANU On 13 September 2022, Indonesian President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo officially introduced the country’s first domestically produced COVID-19 vaccine. The protein subunit vaccine — branded IndoVac — was hailed as an important milestone in the country’s efforts to achieve vaccine self-sufficiency since it comprises nearly 80 per cent local ingredients. That is a great success for a country that has imported all 400 million doses of its COVID-19 vaccines. It also seems to vindicate the 130-year-old state-owned vaccine producer, Bio Farma, which was likened to a ‘ vaccine tailor ’ for its bulk import and repackaging deal with China’s Sinovac. Bio Farma is now mulling plans to export and donate this ‘home-grown’ vaccine to African countries. The company’s status as the largest polio vaccine exporter in the world makes this ambition feasible. Yet the credit for IndoVac should not be given to domestic efforts alone. This significant domestic achievement was m

Authors: Maria Monica Wihardja, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute and Kiki Verico, LPEM FEB University of Indonesia As the tectonic plates of the global balance of power are shifting, leaving a widening fault line in the international order, some countries face both the onerous challenge and unparalleled opportunity to build bridges. The countries that find themselves in this position are middle-powers . These are countries whose unilateral actions cannot project economic or military power on a global scale, but who are large enough to exert influence. It is fortuitous that the three G20 presidencies after Indonesia fall again on middle-power countries, namely India, Brazil and South Africa. The success of the 2022 G20 Bali Summit shows that the G20 is a process that enables middle-power countries to be fully integrated into the global system. Through the G20 process, they play a critical role in reshaping global geopolitics by brokering deals among superpowers and warring countries. T

Author: Editorial Board, ANU Is there anything that can’t be solved by getting away to Bali for a few days? For months leading up to last week’s G20 Leaders’ Summit, it was hard to say whether expectations for Indonesia’s presidency were too high or too low. Certainly, it appeared plausible that the G20’s decision-making processes would seize up as members divided over Russia’s participation. In the immediate wake of the invasion of Ukraine, it wasn’t outlandish to expect that a leaders’ summit wouldn’t go ahead at all; in this view, the bar for success was merely having the key players show up, regardless of whether anything of substance was achieved. At the same time, Indonesian President Joko Widodo made a big political bet of his own on the success of the summit — enough that some close to the process worried that the Indonesian public, to whom the government was eager to sell a success story ex ante, weren’t properly prepared for the real possibility that this G20 could be a