Today Trends

Author: Editorial Board, ANU The ageing and shrinking of populations in many parts of East Asia will be a defining part of their economic and social development this century, just as the trade-fuelled economic boom was in the latter half of the previous one. The ageing crisis will have a cascading effect on many aspects of national economic and political power, making it harder to staff militaries, increasing the burden on public finances and making it imperative to squeeze more productivity out of a smaller working-age population. Japan’s Prime Minister Fumio Kishida captured the sense of the crisis when he declared in January 2023 that his country ‘is on the cusp of whether it can maintain its societal functions’ with a declining population. South Korea is in the exact same place, if not more so. At the same time, major economies in developing South and Southeast Asia face the opposite challenge of creating enough jobs for the growing number of young people who need them — and

Author: George Magnus, Oxford University It is often said that demographics are destiny, but at a macroeconomic level, ageing societies do not need to turn into the economic graveyards that pessimists assert they will. There are important, if limited, coping mechanisms to deal with the predicted stagnation or fall in the working-age population that most countries will face sooner or later. Public policymakers could aim to raise immigration , boost the labour force participation rates of older workers and women and crank up productivity growth. Several Asian states will have to consider these options much more carefully if they are to adapt, stabilise the working-age population impact of ageing and provide for sustainable public finances. Leaving aside Japan, Australia and New Zealand, which have ‘aged’ — defined as a doubling of the over 65s as a share of the total population to 14 per cent — over half a century or more, most other countries are ageing much faster, that is, over

Author: Ivan Lidarev, King’s College London China has made some very cautious peacemaking moves in the Russia–Ukraine war. In February 2023, Beijing announced a 12-point proposal to end the war and dispatched a Chinese envoy to the conflict after President Xi spoke with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky for the first time since the Russian invasion. Given China’s prolonged reluctance to play a role in resolving the conflict, these steps raise questions. On the level of political symbolism, China’s peacemaking efforts are directed toward Europe, which has long accused it of refusing to help end the conflict. On a more practical level, Beijing seeks to build the diplomatic infrastructure for a future role as a mediator, facilitator or member of a group of intermediaries in the eventual ceasefire or peace negotiations. For this purpose, China’s dispatch of an envoy has established a mechanism of communicating with key parties and exploring their positions. Beijing has also ad

Author: Yuki Tatsumi, Stimson Center One of the key highlights of Japan’s three national security documents released on 16 December 2022 — the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy and the Defense Build-up Plan (DBP) — is the commitment to increase defence spending. The 2022 DBP revealed that the Japanese government will spend approximately 43 trillion yen (US$310 billion) from 2023–27 to fund the defence capability build-up. Japan’s Ministry of Defence (JMOD) budget will increase annually to reach 8.9 trillion yen (US$64.1 billion) in 2027. The 2023 defence budget demonstrates Tokyo’s determination to follow through on its five-year spending commitments under the DBP. The total budget of over 6.6 trillion yen (US$47.5 billion) is a 27.5 per cent increase from 2022 and the biggest defence budget in Japan’s post-war history. But the ‘roughly 2 per cent of GDP’ goal that Prime Minister Fumio Kishida discussed in his press conference on 16 December 2022 followin

Author: Dursun Peksen, University of Memphis Economic sanctions have assumed a prominent role in global politics since the turn of the twenty-first century. With a lack of public support for military interventions, policymakers have increasingly turned to the non-violent coercive tool of sanctions to address major crises such as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and political violence in Venezuela. But what effects do these popular coercive instruments have on human rights in target countries? Evidence shows that sanctions lead to increased levels of political repression by target governments. Sender states usually justify the use of sanctions by arguing that external trade and financial restrictions will force target governments to alter their policies in line with sender demands. Target governments may face a significant decline in their capacity to rule due to restricted access to essential military and economic resources. Reduced access to these resources then undermines the gover

Author: Akash Sahu, New Delhi The security environment in the Indo-Pacific has increasingly become volatile due to great power rivalry. Australia’s latest Defence Strategic Review affirms that the ‘defence of Australia lies in the collective security of the Indo-Pacific’. Canberra will be keen to sustain and enhance its role in the Indo-Pacific, particularly to balance China. Australia’s current capabilities under the ‘balanced force’ model are insufficient to manage larger threats. For this reason, it is eager to pursue missile development and acquire advanced military equipment. The review is an important step in evaluating capabilities and charting a course to lead Australia towards a more prominent position in the regional security architecture. Beijing may be too occupied with larger goals of self-sufficiency , for areas like military engine development, to match US capacities. China enjoys an advantage in defence production, with its manufacturing base and regional supply

Author: Susannah Patton, Lowy Institute Following the 2021 coup, Myanmar has experienced more than two years of violent and repressive military rule. Sanctions have been a central plank in the responses of the United States and European countries. While there is scant evidence that sanctions will shift the junta from its destructive and repressive course, a lack of alternative options to influence outcomes in Myanmar means they are likely to remain a feature of the response by Western countries. A sharply worsening situation provides more context for sanctions against Myanmar. According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, nearly 80 per cent of townships have been affected by conflict since the coup, with around 3000 people killed by security forces and more than 17,000 detained. All political parties, including the National League for Democracy, have been dissolved. Former state counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi has been sentenced to 33 years imprison

Author: Jeffrey Reeves, Onyx Strategic Insights The Power of Siberia-2 (PoS2) gas pipeline has the potential to transform Northeast Asian energy security dynamics, provided Moscow and Beijing agree to its specific terms . With a predicted annual transport capacity of around 50 billion cubic metres of gas, the pipeline’s construction will increase the natural gas supply to China and Asia. This new source of natural gas will help states diversify their energy portfolios and potentially enable a faster transition away from coal. The pipeline’s construction and maintenance will generate thousands of new jobs across the region and billions of dollars in revenue. While China is the clear winner from this new source of stable supply at a bargain price , Mongolia will also see socio-economic and strategic benefits . Some observers have cautioned Ulaanbaatar against working with Russia and China on ideological and strategic grounds. But a cost-benefit analysis suggests that Mongolia has

Authors: M Habib Abiyan Dzakwan and Novia Xu May 2023 marked 15 months since Russia launched military action against Ukraine. Not only does the confrontation have devastating impacts on the battleground, it has also hurt many developing countries economically. The turmoil in international energy markets, including through the effect of economic sanctions imposed on Russia, has challenged energy and decarbonisation policies around the world. Since February 2022, 21 developed countries have hit Russia with 180 trade-related sanctions, 155 financial institution-related sanctions and 173 sanctions on Russian individuals. These extensive economic sanctions have hurt but not deterred Russia militarily. Indonesia’s ‘free and active’ foreign policy draws the line at condemning violations of international humanitarian law, providing humanitarian assistance to affected communities and attempting to mediate peace talks between the warring parties . This stance has helped Indonesia navigate