Today Trends

Author: Made Supriatma, ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute A long-standing rumour in Indonesian politics has finally become a reality. Prabowo Subianto has selected Gibran Rakabuming Raka, the current mayor of Solo and the son of President Jokowi, as his running mate for the 2024 presidential race. This decision was made just a week after the Constitutional Court relaxed the age limit requirement for vice presidential candidate. Notably, a month earlier, Kaesang Pengarep, the youngest son of Jokowi, was appointed as the chairman of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) just two days after becoming a member. The entrance of two of the president’s sons into these crucial political positions reflects President Jokowi’s confidence in his political influence. Furthermore, it underscores Jokowi’s capacity to act autonomously from political parties and other political forces. By throwing his support behind Prabowo, Jokowi wields independent power even apart from the Indonesian Democratic

Author: Nyi Nyi Kyaw, Chiang Mai University Tougher times await Myanmar migrant workers in Southeast Asia. Two recent orders issued by Myanmar’s junta State Administration Council (SAC) in September will result in higher costs of moving, living and working abroad for migrant workers and a fall in their disposable income and savings. The first is the order that Myanmar migrant workers who migrate from September 2023 with the assistance of employment agencies will have to remit at least 25 per cent of their salaries every month. These remittances must be sent through the official channel recognised by the SAC at an exchange rate significantly lower than the market rate. The World Bank estimated the volume of remittances at US$1.9 billion in 2022, down from US$2 billion in 2021 (the year that followed the coup) and US$2.67 billion in 2020 (the year before the coup). Hundreds of millions of dollars or more are remitted informally and via unknown channels. This forced remittance ord

Author: Arianto Patunru, ANU In March 2023, the Iranian government claimed to have discovered a massive lithium deposit, in the magnitude of 8.5 million tons. China is the largest consumer of lithium, which it mostly imports from Australia, the world’s biggest exporter of lithium. In 2020, it was responsible for almost half of the lithium available in the world. More than 90 per cent of Australia’s lithium is exported to China, filling 85 per cent of the latter’s need. In the first half of 2023, Australia’s revenue from selling lithium concentrate to China exceeded US$7 billion. Lithium is a key component of electric vehicle (EV) batteries and given China’s drive to become the world’s leading EV producer, its demand for lithium will only increase — Australia’s lithium export revenue was estimated to more than triple over 2022–2023. But Iran’s lithium discovery might challenge Australia’s dominance in the Chinese market . China is the largest export destination of both Iran and

Author: Jürgen Rüland, University of Freiburg Since 2011, observers have regarded Indonesia as a hot accession candidate should BRICS, a forum of emerging powers with Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa as members, decide to enlarge their club. When during the latest BRICS summit held in South Africa in August 2023 China persuaded its hesitant partners to invite new members to the forum, Indonesia was on the cards of all five BRICS member governments. The country’s potential value for BRICS is obvious. It is the country with the world’s fourth largest population, a fast-growing economy with the potential to become one of the globe’s top five economies by 2045 and a leading power in Southeast Asia, a strategically important region where the United States and China compete for influence. But surprisingly, Indonesia was not among the six countries — Argentina, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Iran and Ethiopia — that were selected from among 23 countries that

Author: Yasumasa Yamamoto, Kyoto University Digital transformation is crucial to overcoming a number of big global challenges. Yet Japan has unique disadvantages that put it behind global digital leaders such as the United States, Singapore and China and hamper its economic partnerships in the region.   Japan’s government entities and regulators are too deeply embedded in the digital industry’s fixed structure — which lacks digital literacy, client responsibility and close connections with traditional technology outsourcing vendors — making it difficult to drive digitisation in the private and public sectors. This fixed mindset, which is especially strong in Tokyo, demands efforts to promote digitisation and eventually digital transformation in rural areas where regulation and mindset problems are less rigid. But cities outside Tokyo lack digital experts to tackle local challenges through digital transformation.   Japan has other structural problems that hinder digital transformati

Author: Benjamin Herscovitch, ANU Even as the chokehold of Beijing’s economic coercion loosens , trade diversification remains the mantra in Canberra. The Anthony Albanese government has picked up, with gusto, predecessor Scott Morrison’s mission of getting Australian exports to more markets to offset perceived over-reliance on China. In just shy of 18 months in the portfolio, Trade Minister Don Farrell has presided over the entry into force of free trade agreements with India and the United Kingdom , as well as pressing for progress on negotiations with the European Union. Meanwhile, Australia’s free trade agreement with ASEAN and New Zealand is being upgraded and the United Kingdom has joined the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). Despite these trade wins, there’s still a big Taiwan-shaped hole in Australia’s efforts to moderate its export dependence on China. The Taiwanese economy sucked in a colossal AU$30 billion worth of Aus

Author: Walter Brenno Colnaghi, LSE On 24 August 2023, immediately after Japanese authorities released treated wastewater from the Fukushima nuclear plant into the Pacific Ocean, China suspended all seafood imports from Japan. While the public’s concerns over contamination might justify the decision, China’s track record of employing plausible deniability , coupled with Japan’s compliance with international safety standards and China’s similar nuclear waste management practices, raise questions about China’s motivations. The restriction was issued by the General Administration of Customs and followed a protracted disinformation campaign aimed at stoking public fears, suggesting that political motivations lie behind the decision. The episode offered a pretext for Beijing to punish Tokyo’s push to increase security cooperation with Seoul and Washington. It also allowed China to send signals to both domestic and international audiences. Domestically, Beijing stoked anti-Japanes

Editorial Board, ANU Quite aside from the thorny issues of nepotism and dynasty-building, the Indonesian Constitutional Court’s decision to open a loophole that allows President Joko (Jokowi) Widodo’s son to participate in February’s presidential election is unlikely to stand as a great moment in national jurisprudence. Throughout 2023, a major question of speculation in Indonesia has been whether the 36-year-old Gibran Rakabuming Raka, who in 2022 was elected mayor of his and his father’s home city of Solo, would join the presidential ticket of Defence Minister Prabowo Subianto. The move would both give Prabowo a seal of approval from an unprecedentedly popular, outgoing President, as well as strengthening Gibran’s future presidential potential. Gibran’s candidacy was pushed by Prabowo, who was courting Jokowi’s support by posing as a dependable ally and successor. Jokowi, initially sceptical of his son’s electoral prospects on the national stage, and wary of accusations of nepot

Author: Yoes C Kenawas, Institute for Advanced Research, Atma Jaya Catholic University Just three days after he became a member of the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) in September 2023, Indonesian President Joko ‘Jokowi’ Widodo’s youngest son, Kaesang Pangarep, was appointed the party’s chairman . Kaesang’s ascendancy to PSI’s leadership caps what is probably the fastest political rise ever seen in Indonesian politics for someone who is not the founder of a political party. Less than three weeks later, the Indonesian public was again shocked by a Constitutional Court decision to exempt candidates with experience as elected officials from a legal rule barring those under 40 from competing in presidential elections. The Court’s ruling paves the way for President Jokowi’s eldest son, the 36-year-old Gibran Rakabuming Raka, to run in the 2024 presidential elections. These twin events mark the emergence of a Jokowi dynasty, as the president prepares to leave office in 2024. The appo