Today Trends

Author: Richard Pomfret, University of Adelaide In 2023, the Central Asian leaders showed increased willingness to institutionalise cooperation through annual summits and unified approaches to third countries. Despite foreign policy challenges associated with the Russia–Ukraine war, water disputes with Afghanistan and clashes on the Kyrgyz–Tajik border, the focus of these meetings remained economic. Since 2017, the five Central Asian leaders have met in Central Asian Summits in Almaty (Kazakhstan, 2018), Tashkent (Uzbekistan, 2019), Awaza, Turkmenistan (2021), and Cholpon-Ata, Kyrgyz Republic (2022). The September 2023 summit in Dushanbe, Tajikistan, was also attended by Azerbaijan President Aliyev. The post-summit briefing emphasised that ‘the primary task is to develop cooperation in the trade and economic field and create favourable conditions for trade and investment’. Since Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, the trade and infrastructure focus has shifted to East–West connect

Author: Willem Thorbecke, RIETI The value and sophistication of China’s exports has exploded since the 1990s. In 1995, the value of China’s total exports was US$224 billion, with textiles comprising 30 per cent of exports, electronics 14 per cent and machinery 10 per cent. In 2021, China’s total exports equalled US$3.7 trillion. The share of textiles fell to 13 per cent, while the share of electronics rose to 26 per cent and machinery to 19 per cent. China’s efficiency in producing technologically sophisticated products accelerated further during the COVID-19 pandemic. While exports of serums and vaccines equalled less than US$1 billion in 2019, these exports rose to more than US$25 billion in 2021. This increase was primarily due to exports of Chinese-made COVID-19 vaccines. Cesar A Hidalgo and Ricardo Hausmann have reasoned that products exported by many countries are easier to produce while those exported by only a few countries are more difficult to produce. They also assumed

Author: Guangwei Li, ShanghaiTech University China’s industrial policy has drawn global attention, sparking different reactions from developed and developing nations. Developed countries tend to perceive China’s industrial policies as a threat to their firms’ competitive positions, leading them to respond with their own industrial policies. Many developing countries view China’s policy as a blueprint for economic success, inspiring them to adopt similar policies in the hope of achieving rapid economic growth. From both perspectives, though, there’s a consistent underlying assumption — acceptance of the significant role of industrial policy in China’s economic success. The history of Chinese industrial policies, however, offers valuable insights. Initially, Chinese industry operated under a state-centred, ‘pure’ Soviet-style planned economy, where industrial policies in the usual sense did not exist. Instead, economic directives were authoritative commands. It was only during the r

Authors: William J Jones and Douglas Rhein, Mahidol University International College During the Cold War, ASEAN states found a unifying rationale — holding back communism at the Mekong River. The unifying force of anti-communism served ASEAN states well and provided ASEAN itself with a veneer of credibility. In the post-Cold War era, ASEAN shifted its focus to economic cooperation, its most successful area of cooperation. ASEAN centrality is a de facto outcome of US foreign policy during the Cold War but also a hard-won point of pride for the original five members of ASEAN. ASEAN member states have increasingly been unable to find common ground on regional security issues, best exemplified by the lack of a joint communique at the 2012 ASEAN Summit in Phnom Phen due to divergent positions on the South China Sea dispute. The situation in Myanmar again threatens regional security and ASEAN’s credibility. With China and Russia opposing arms embargoes and sanctions, the United Nation

Author: Editorial Board, ANU No first-term President of the United States since the beginning of scientific polling has been as unpopular at this point of the presidential cycle as Joe Biden is now — at least if you believe the most recent polls. On the most important international issue facing Biden, the Gaza conflict, barely a third of voters approve of his performance. Moreover, the demographic most upset with Washington’s response to the conflict is one that could doom his chances in a crucial swing state: more Arab-Americans live in Michigan than in any other state bar California. Not even the relatively healthy economy — the Federal Reserve has against the odds engineered a successful disinflation while maintaining respectable GDP growth — seems to be winning Biden much affection from voters. If he stays in the race, Biden will almost certainly be facing a rematch with his 2020 opponent. Donald Trump is both a wounded political animal and a dangerous one. Defeat three years

Author: Thomas Pepinsky, Cornell University The United States is less than a year away from its next presidential election. Although former president Donald Trump faces numerous civil and criminal indictments, he will most likely be the Republican Party’s nominee for the third election in a row. Incumbent President Joe Biden will run for re-election from the Democratic Party, hoping that the country’s strong economic performance will ease voters’ concerns about his age and fitness for office. The 2024 presidential election campaign comes at a moment of uncertainty in international politics. The United States and China are searching for a new footing , Israel continues its invasion of Gaza in response to Hamas’s terrorist actions and war crimes and Ukraine continues to mount a successful armed resistance to Russia’s illegal invasion. The Indo-Pacific security architecture is also changing, with new initiatives such as AUKUS and the Quad bringing Australia closer to the United Sta

Author: Yan Liang, Willamette University While pundits not long ago were debating China’s rise, the emerging consensus is now heralding an end to the ‘China miracle’. China’s old model of credit-fuelled, investment-driven growth has been severely undercut by the real estate crisis, as well as weak consumption and export demand. But recent data suggests that recovery has regained momentum. China’s real GDP growth rate in the first three quarters of 2023 reached 5.2 per cent year-on-year. Solar cell, service robots and integrated circuits production increased by 62.8 per cent, 59.1 per cent and 34.5 per cent respectively in October 2023. Infrastructure and manufacturing investments expanded by 5.9 per cent and 6.2 per cent in the first ten months, offsetting the 9.3 per cent contraction in real estate investment. Outside of the real estate sector, private investment grew by 9.1 per cent. Consumption also saw a strong rebound, though exports fell by 6.4 per cent year-on-year in Octob

Author: John Quiggin, University of Queensland At the beginning of 2023, Australia’s relationship with the People’s Republic of China appeared to be one of hostility across the board, in both military and economic terms. In March, the Nine newspapers ran a series titled ‘ Red Alert ’, premised on the claim that China and Australia could be at war within three years. The allusion to communism was presumably intentional, even though it is now almost impossible to detect any trace of revolutionary fervour amid the old-fashioned nationalist rhetoric emerging from Beijing. On the military front, the Albanese government had embraced the AUKUS agreement even more fervently than its predecessors. China perceives itself in the crosshairs of the trilateral arrangement, which it describes as ‘extremely irresponsible’. In economic terms, China maintained its restrictions on Australian exports of coal, copper, sugar, cotton, wine and barley. These restrictions — widely seen as an exercise in

Author: Liew Chin Tong, Deputy Minister of Investment, Trade and Industry, Malaysia Semiconductors are quickly becoming both the new oil and a new source of global conflict. Today, everything that requires computing power has chips fitted, from weapons to watches and cars. The artificial intelligence era is only just beginning, which will inevitably lead to even greater use of semiconductor chips. Malaysia is right in the middle of the global chip making supply chain. The electrical and electronics sector comprises about 7 per cent of Malaysia’s GDP, with semiconductor devices and electronic integrated circuits alone making up a quarter of total exports, totalling RM387 billion in export value in 2022. As the world’s sixth largest semiconductor exporter, Malaysia holds 7 per cent of global market share and contributed to 23 per cent of US semiconductor trade in 2022. Malaysia is welcoming more investment into the semiconductor value chain. The country has an established presence