Events in Myanmar leave ASEAN behind

Author: Gregory Poling, CSIS

On 24 April, ASEAN leaders convened in Jakarta for a special summit on the situation in Myanmar. Outside parties including the United States were happy to give the bloc the chance to lead, recognising that ASEAN centrality — for all its faults — is an important plank of regional stability. Still, expectations heading into the summit were low; the grouping has long avoided sensitive political or security issues and left mediation to others.

But against the odds, the meeting ended with an ambitious five-point consensus. The nine other members of ASEAN declared there ‘shall’ be an immediate cessation of violence, a dialogue between the opposing sides mediated by a special envoy from ASEAN, a delegation to meet with all parties involved, and the provision of humanitarian assistance.

High hopes lasted barely 24 hours. Coup leader General Min Aung Hlaing had attended the summit but remained coy about whether he endorsed the consensus. He was barely back home in Naypyidaw when he rebuked it. The junta’s ruling body, the State Administration Council (SAC), announced it would consider ASEAN’s ‘suggestions’, but only after ‘the situation returns to stability’. There would be no cessation of violence and no dialogue with the National Unity Government (NUG) representing most of those standing against the junta. This came as no surprise to the NUG, which was denied access to the summit.

In the weeks since, ASEAN leaders have focused on the other points of the consensus, particularly the choice of a special envoy. But the junta has shown no interest in talking. On 7 May, the SAC announced that it would not accept any visit until the domestic situation ‘stabilises’. On 11 May, a group of ethnic armies, most notably the Restoration Council for Shan State and the Democratic Karen Benevolent Army, called on ASEAN and other partners to mediate, but they are clearly in the minority. The NUG has said it will not negotiate with the junta under current circumstances. Most of the largest ethnic armed organisations seem to agree.

All sides on the ground are preparing for a protracted struggle that they hope will shift the status quo in their favour. The NUG has established a People’s Defense Force, training civilians to fight the junta. This force is being trained in territory controlled by the Karen National Union who is engaged in large-scale clashes with the Myanmar military and its allied militias. The Kachin Independence Army has also intensified its fight. The NUG’s nascent plan is to work in coalition with these and other ethnic armed organisations to open multiple fronts while the nationwide civil disobedience movement continues to deprive the junta of revenue and any claim to be effectively governing.

ASEAN, meanwhile, has been left behind. Whatever momentum the grouping carried out of the 24 April summit has dissipated. As all sides arm themselves, the protestor death toll soars past 800, and the Myanmar economy faces collapse, ASEAN leisurely deliberates over the name of an envoy no one is interested in meeting.

It does still have a role to play through the only part of the five-point consensus that remains viable: the demand for humanitarian access. Food prices are rising, the healthcare system in Myanmar is in tatters, COVID-19 testing has stopped, and military offensives in Karen, Kachin and Chin states have left tens of thousands displaced without food, shelter or other necessities. Aid will be desperately needed for years potentially, as the armed crisis deepens and economic advances of the last decade disappear. ASEAN has a far better chance than Western nations of convincing the junta that opening humanitarian corridors would be in its best interests. Similarly, the rest of ASEAN should quietly urge the Thai government to keep the border open for aid to get in and refugees to get out.

This humanitarian mission is vital. And the last month has shown that it is probably the limit of what ASEAN can accomplish in Myanmar in the near term. But there is considerable scope for individual members to do more. Thailand, for instance, has more leverage in Myanmar than any country except China. And it will face increasing pressure to use it. Among other things, it could play an important role in reducing the flow of revenue to the junta while mitigating the impact on Myanmar citizens (and thereby reducing the flow of economic migrants and refugees into Thailand).

Most immediately, Bangkok could use Prime Minister Prayuth Chan-o-cha’s back channel with Min Aung Hlaing to try and convince him of the necessity of having the contractual payments of the state-owned PTT of Thailand along with Total, Chevron, and other oil companies operating in Myanmar parked in a holding account for the duration of the crisis. The junta would lose access to funds but keep the lights on in Yangon. The alternative, should Washington and Brussels impose unilateral sanctions on the Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise, would be losing both. If anyone could convince the junta to accept such a bitter pill, it would be the Thai leadership.

Outside parties including the United States, the European Union and Japan have shown respect for ASEAN’s prerogatives and endorsed the 24 April consensus. But with it in tatters, they will increasingly turn to bilateral coordination with each other and Myanmar’s neighbours in pursuit of more ambitious initiatives. That will not be an assault on ASEAN’s centrality, but a recognition of its limitations.

Gregory B Poling is a Senior Fellow for Southeast Asia and Director of the Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, DC.

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