Solid processes yield mixed outcomes in US–East Asia relations

For Americans engaged with East Asia, 2023 started inauspiciously. On 28 January, a high-altitude balloon was discovered flying across North America. 

Suspected of being a Chinese spy balloon carrying intelligence-gathering equipment, it was shot down by the US Air Force on 4 February on the order of President Joe Biden. The incident resulted in Secretary of State Antony Blinken postponing his long-awaited trip to China, which would have been the first such visit since 2018.  

Blinken did eventually visit Beijing in June 2023, as did Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen in July and Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo in August. But the balloon incident symbolised continued tensions between the United States and China on a wide range of issues. 

In 2023, the United States followed the conclusion of its National Security Strategy, issued in October 2022. This strategy claims that ‘The PRC is the only competitor with both the intent to reshape the international order and, increasingly, the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it’. US public opinion supported this, with 83 per cent of respondents viewing China ‘unfavourably’ versus only 14 per cent ‘favourably’, according to the Pew Research Center.

Though less noticed by the US public than the balloon incident, Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s 12–13 January visit to Washington DC reflected the cooperative side of the United States’ engagement with Asia. Kishida announced the Japanese government’s decision to increase its defence expenditure to 2 per cent of GDP by 2027 — a significant increase from the 1 per cent ceiling adhered to since 1976. Widely welcomed in Washington, Biden announced, ‘We’re modernising our military alliance, building on Japan’s historic increase in defence spending and the new national security strategy’.   

Kishida’s January visit was followed in April by South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol’s state visit. This marked the first state visit to Washington by a South Korean president since Lee Myung-bak in 2011. The summit celebrated the 70th anniversary of the US–South Korea bilateral alliance and aimed to strengthen it not only in the traditional security realm, but also in artificial intelligence, space cooperation and advanced technology.  

On 18 August, Biden hosted a Trilateral Leaders’ Summit at Camp David, inviting Kishida and Yoon — the first-ever standalone summit of leaders from the United States, Japan and South Korea. It was a US effort to encourage Japan and South Korea to mend their differences over historical issues and to cooperate with each other in the face of security challenges posed by China, Russia and North Korea.  

In Southeast Asia, Biden visited Vietnam in early September. In his meeting with Communist Party General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong, Biden agreed to raise bilateral ties to the highest level — a ‘comprehensive strategic partnership’ — significantly upgrading the relationship.  

The Quad summit scheduled for May in Sydney was cancelled because Biden pulled out at the last minute to deal with an impending US debt default. But the G7 Summit in Hiroshima later provided an opportunity for the Quad to meet briefly and to issue the Quad Leaders’ Joint Statement on 20 May. 

Despite US proclamations since 2009 of an ‘Asia pivot’ or ‘Asia rebalance’, issues and events outside Asia — including Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Israel–Hamas war — have deflected the United States’ attention and resources away from Asia. This situation is unlikely to change soon.

The Biden administration has created numerous venues, fora and committees to consult with allies and partners. But process does not always make results. For instance, the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, created as an alternative to the Trans-Pacific Partnership, has been more successful in producing meetings than realising concrete results that promote US economic interests.

Biden and his advisors also see the world through the lens of the Cold War, a black-or-white, democracy-versus-autocracy framework outdated by at least 30 years. Global realities, especially in Asia, demand a much more complex, nuanced and sophisticated approach.

Three years into the Biden administration, there is no comprehensive Asia strategy. Competition with China for instance, demands a coherent strategy that encompasses military security, trade, investment, finance, technology and foreign aid. To date, this has not materialised.

Senior Biden administration officials tend to be long-time Washington bureaucrats who lack business experience, especially in Asia. This has further led to a focus on committees, meetings and processes — rather than visible results. 

2023 ended on a more positive note. A Biden–Xi meeting on 15 November after the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation meeting in San Francisco announced ‘areas of potential cooperation’, including the resumption of high-level military-to-military communication. Russia’s war in Ukraine and the Israel–Hamas war have spurred the Biden administration’s desire to ‘stabilise’ relations with Asia and avert a potential military conflict involving China, Taiwan or North Korea. 

With 2024 being an election year in many countries — including Taiwan, South Korea and the United States — the Biden administration will try to take credit for positive developments in Asia. It will attempt to institutionalise these gains so a potential future Republican administration will find them hard to reverse.    

Glen S. Fukushima is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.

This article is part of an EAF special feature series on 2023 in review and the year ahead.

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